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Abstract 
This thesis examines the value of political connections for business groups by 
constructing a unique dataset that allows us to identify the form and extent of the connections. 
Results show firms’ membership to family-controlled business groups (South Korean chaebol) 
play a key role in determining the value of political connections. Politically connected chaebol 
experience substantial price increases following the establishment of the connection than other 
firms, but the reverse is found for other (non-family-controlled) connected business groups. 
The results are robust when we define political connection at the business group level, 
suggesting that there is a spill over in the value of connections from the connected firms to 
other affiliate members in the same business group. Political connections established through 
marital networks and to powerful politicians are most valuable. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Corporate political connections are prevalent worldwide (Faccio, 2006). Despite the 
considerable research interest on political connections, the evidence on whether the 
connections enhance firm value is mixed. While for some firms the political influence they 
seek will be bound to matters that affect the sector of the economy in which they operate, others 
that operate across the entire economy may seek more extensive political favors. While there 
are many ways in which businessmen can influence government, in this paper we deal with 
just one selected aspect of business-government relations – the intimate ties between 
controlling owners of business groups and politicians. 
The literature suggests two competing hypotheses on the value of political connections: 
value-adding and value-destroying. Under the value-adding hypothesis, political connections 
create potential resources that can add value to connected firms, for example, by providing 
them greater access to key resources from the government (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja 
and Mian, 2005; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2006; 
Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2013;), and lowering taxation 
(Faccio, 2010) and risks (Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar, 2012). The value-
destroying hypothesis predicts the opposite, where political connections provide the means for 
rent-seeking politicians to accomplish policy goals (De Soto, 1990; Morck, Stangeland, and 
Yeung, 2000; Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar, 2007) and to potentially expropriate 
outside minority shareholders (Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar, 2012; Qian, Pan, and 
Yeung, 2011). In fact, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) indicate that politicians are willing to provide 
subsidies to connected firms, but not for free. 
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In a capital market, investors will price the benefits or costs of political connections. 
Using the change in political landscapes, as marked by either the establishment or the 
termination of political connections, cross-country and country-specific evidence shows that 
political connections can either add value (Roberts, 1990; Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; 
Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008; Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2008; Faccio and Parsley, 
2009) or destroy value to the connected firms (Faccio, 2006; Fan, Wong, Zhang , 2007). The 
net effect of political ties is determined by a tradeoff between the marginal benefits and 
marginal costs of the connections (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), so that if the marginal benefits 
exceed the marginal costs, the political connection leads to an increase in the equity value of 
the connected firm, and vice versa.  
We continue this line of inquiry by testing which of the above two competing hypotheses 
prevails in Korea. Korea has several unique characteristics that make it particularly suited to 
investigate the impact of political connections on stock price. First, the perceived level of 
corruption in Korea suggests that the value of political connections is likely to be greater than 
in less corrupted countries.1In a cross-country analysis, Faccio (2006) reports that political 
connections are more common in countries with a high level of corruption. Faccio and Parsley 
(2009) find connected firms in more corrupted countries experience a larger stock price decline 
around the termination of political connections, indicating that connections matter more to firm 
value in countries with a higher level of corruption. 
                                                 
1 In the 2008 edition of Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International, Korea ranked 40th with a 
score of 5.6 and was thus perceived to be less corrupted than the following countries where political connections 
have been found to matter significantly to firm value: Malaysia (Johnson and Mitton, 2003), ranked 47th with a 
score of 5.1; China (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007), ranked 72th with a score of 3.6; Brazil (Claessens, Feijen, and 
Laeven, 2008), ranked 80th with a score of 3.5; Indonesia (Fisman, 2001), ranked 126th with a score of 2.6; and 
Pakistan (Khwaja and Mian, 2005), ranked 134th with a score of 2.5. Korea was however perceived to be more 
corrupted than the following countries where political connections have also been found to matter to firm value: 
Denmark (Amore and Bennedsen, 2012), which was ranked 1st with a score of 9.3; Canada (Morck, Stangeland, 
and Yeung, 2000), ranked 9th with a score of 8.7; the United States (Roberts, 1990; Goldman, Rocholl and So, 
2009), ranked 18th with a score of 7.3; and France (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar and Thesmar, 2007), ranked 23th 
with a score of 6.9. 
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 Second, large and family-controlled business groups known as chaebols are ubiquitous 
in Korea (Ferris, Kim, and Kitsabunnarart, 2003), accounting for 62.57% of the country’s total 
market capitalization. One notable feature is that the ownership of chaebols is heavily 
concentrated in founding families who have almost complete control over all firms within the 
group even though the chaebols can be highly diversified (Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2002). With 
such an ownership structure, investors may regard all chaebol affiliates in the same group as a 
single entity in response to corporate events that directly affect only one member firm (Bae, 
Cheon, and Kang, 2008).2 This ownership structure provides the opportunity to test the role of 
chaebols in the valuation of political connections. Our tests capitalizes on this unique feature 
of cheabols by shedding new light on whether the effect of political connections spills over to 
the whole business group or is concentrated only on the individual firm that is directly affected 
by the connection. About 11.24% of our sample of Korean listed firms from 2007 to 2011 
belongs to chaebols, all of which account for 62.57% of the country’s total market 
capitalization. 
Third, Korea has often been labelled as crony capitalism, together with other Asian 
countries like Malaysia (Kang, 2002). Evidence on crony capitalism suggests that dominant 
political leaders use their power to the advantage of their families and friends. Extant literature 
shows that shareholders of politically connected firms obtain benefits from their close ties to 
politicians (e.g., Johnson and Mitton, 2003 for Malaysia; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006 for 
Indonesia). Korea is particularly well known for odious relationships between politicians and 
chaebol founding families. Upper class families tend to form business and/or political alliance 
through marriage exchanges among themselves. Through marriage of family members, 
chaebols have developed extensive connections with the country’s inner circles and many high-
                                                 
2 Bae, Cheon, and Kang (2008) investigate the effect of earnings releases by a chaebol affiliate on the share price 
of other member firms in the same group. They find that the announcement of an increase in earnings by a chaebol 
firm has a positive effect on the abnormal returns for other affiliates within the same group. The abnormal returns 
for the announcing affiliates are also positively associated with those for non-announcing affiliates.  
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ranking politicians (Kim, 2007). The Monopoly Regulation Fair Trade Act requires Korean 
firms to report the status of affiliate shareholders including family owners and their relatives. 
This regulatory system allows us to construct a unique database which identifies the family 
networks between politicians and chaebol founding families.  
The specific relationship between politicians and chaebols is best exemplified using the 
recent government where President Lee Myung bak (2008-2012) is connected to six chaebols 
through the following family networks. The Hyosung group (ranked the 33rd largest business 
group in 2008) is connected through the marriage between Lee’s daughter and a member of the 
controlling family of the Hyosung group. Through the marriage of Lee’s niece, Lee is 
connected to the LG group (ranked the 5th largest business group in 2008) and the LS group 
(ranked the 24th largest business group in 2008). Lee is also connected to The Hyundai Motor 
group (ranked the 3rd largest business group in 2008) and the Hyundai Department group 
(ranked the 37th largest business group in 2008) where he previously held directorship. Finally, 
the Kolon Group (ranked the 40th largest business group in 2008) is connected through Lee’s 
brother.   
The shift in the political landscapes in Korea due to changes in the government also 
provides a natural experiment for testing the impact of political connections particularly in 
association with chaebols. Traditionally, the Conservative Party has maintained a close 
relationship with chaebols, while the opposing Liberal party is often against chaebols. Chaebols 
were the creation of the Conservative government of Park in the 1960s in order to boost the 
economy and to pursue the government political goals. Since then, the Conservative 
government has openly supported chaebols and granted exclusive rights in profitable industries 
and monopolistic access to resource (Kang, 2002).  
With the onset of the 1997 Asian crisis, a finger of blame was pointed at the Conservative 
Party and chaebols. This has resulted in a major shift in power as the Liberal party began taking 
5 
 
over major positions in the government and National Assembly from the Conservative party. 
The Kim (1998-2002) and Roh (2003-2007) regimes for example undertook policies on the 
alleviation of economic concentration by and restrictions against chaebols. However, the 
Korean economy suffered under the Roh government, and this resulted in the reinstatement of 
the Conservative party at the 2007 presidential and 2008 general elections. The new shift in 
politics marked the third era for the relationship between the government and chaebols in Korea.  
 
1.2 Research Aims and Questions 
This thesis aims to test which of the two competing hypotheses – the value-adding and 
value-destroying – on the value of the establishment of political connections prevailed in Korea 
during the period 2007 through 2011. To achieve this, we calibrate the shareholder’s wealth 
effect of the establishment of political connections by firms in Korea. To capitalize on the 
dominant role played by chaebols in the Korean economy, the analysis extends to a comparison 
of the wealth effect of political connections between chaebol and non-chaebol firms. 
To test whether political connections impact value, we are empirically challenged to 
identify and define political connection. To do this, we carefully assemble a new hand-collected 
database demonstrating the political connection of nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Stock 
Exchange (KSE), measured at both the firm and business group levels separately, using a 
modified method in Faccio (2006).3 Specifically, we define a firm to be politically connected 
if i) a family member of a businessperson (controlling shareholder or top director) is an 
immediate relative (blood relative or in-law relative) of an incumbent politician; ii) a 
businessperson is closely related to a prominent politician (through formal directorship held by 
                                                 
3 Faccio (2006) classifies a company as politically connected if at least one of its large shareholders or top 
executives is a minister, a member of the parliament, or a head of a state, or is closely related to the politicians. 
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a politician or friendship); or iii) a business person is an incumbent politician. Further details 
are described in Chapter 5.  
We define a business groups as a collection of firms that operate in various industries 
and are bound together through managerial, operating, and financial interlocks (Granovetter, 
1994). In Korea, the definition of a business group is provided by the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission (KFTC): “A business group is defined as a group of companies where more than 
30% of the shares are owned by the group’s controlling shareholder and related persons that 
are relatives and other affiliated companies of the same business group (Bae, Kang, and Kim, 
2002; Baek, Kang, and Lee, 2006; Bae, Cheon, and Kang, 2008).” The Monopoly Regulation 
Fair Trade Act by the KFTC designates a large business group as “chaebol” if its total assets 
exceed 5 billion Korean won and has a controlling family-shareholder (with greater than 30% 
ownership of shares across the group of companies (member firms). Business group rankings 
(by total assets) are updated each year (Almeida, Park, Subrahmanyam, and Wolfenzon, 2011). 
 Using the firm level-definition, we are able to identify a total of 468 politicians (1 
president; 4 prime ministers; 48 cabinet ministers; 81 vice-cabinet ministers; 330 
parliamentarians; and 4 heads of a local government during the Lee regime) and 87 politically 
connected firms. To establish the presence of a link between politicians and chaebols, we divide 
the sample into two groups: chaebols and non-chaebol firms. Among the 87 connected firms, 
41 belong to chaebols.  
Faccio (2006) and prior studies define political connection at the individual firm level. 
This is to say that, for our sample, if the connected firm belongs to a chaebol, none of the 
affiliates within the same business group are considered to be connected unless the affiliates 
themselves have direct political ties. The firm-level definition, thus, assumes that the wealth 
effect of political connections does not spill over to other firms within the same business group 
as the connected firm. This study, thus, departs from the literature by also considering this spill 
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over effect in defining connections. In business group level connections, the benefits or costs 
from political connections are shared amongst the group members so that as long as any firm 
within the chaebol is connected, all its affiliates in the business group are deemed to be 
(indirectly) connected as well.  
Using the business group-level definition, we identify 49 business groups with a total of 
139 affiliates that are politically connected. Of the 49 connected business groups, 17 are 
chaebols with 79 member firms and the rest (32) are non-chaebols with 60 affiliates.  
Given our unique data set, our next task is to find a setting that allows us to test whether 
connectedness does indeed affect company value. We employ the standard event study to test 
the impact of political connections on stock prices. Identifying the correct event date is crucial 
to event studies, and so we painstakingly perform this task and identify the date of the following 
five events that mark the establishment of political connections in Korea during the period 
2007-2011: the presidential election; two cases on the appointment of ministers; the election 
for members of parliaments; and the election for the head of a local government. The 
integration of these five events gives us 6,096 observations.  
To understand better the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns of politically 
connected firms, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of stock returns on dummy 
variables for political connections (Politically Connected); whether the firm belongs to a large 
business group (Chaebol); and control variables (Firm Size, Book-to-Market, and Leverage) 
which include fixed effects for Industry, Event Time, and Exchange. For the political 
connection variable, we also create dummies to denote Connected Chaebol and Connected 
Non-Chaebol firms. 
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1.3 Findings and Contributions 
The empirical analyses show support for both the value-adding and value-destroying 
hypotheses in Korea. On average, the establishment of political connections is only marginally 
positive. However, when we partition the sample into chaebol and non-chaebol firms, results 
show that firms’ membership to chaebols plays a key role in determining whether political 
connections are valuable or not. Around the establishment of political connections, we find 
results consistent with the value-adding hypothesis only for chaebol firms. Specifically, 
chaebol firms with connections have a stock return that is 4.98% higher than other firms after 
controlling for several firm characteristics. In contrast, non-chaebol firms with connections 
suffer a significant price drop (the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is -3.14%), 
consistent with the value-destroying hypothesis.  
The results are robust when we define political connections at the business group level. 
Controlling for several firm-specific factors, chaebol firms with connections have an average 
4.28% higher stock return than other firms whereas the average stock return for non-chaebol 
firms with connections is 3.93% lower. These results indicate that new political connections 
by an affiliate firm have a “spill over” effect on the share price of other members within the 
same business group, and that more importantly, only chaebol firms stand to gain from the 
political connections. 
Additionally, we find the value of the connections depends very much on how the firm 
is connected to the politician. First, connections through a marital network between a member 
of the controlling family and a member of the politician’s family add more value (by about 6%) 
to chaebol firms than other forms of connections. Second, the value of the connections 
increases linearly with the power held by the connected politician. To be precise, chaebol firms 
that are associated with a president have the largest increase in stock price, followed by chaebol 
firms connected with ministers and then members of parliament.   
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This research belongs to the literature that looks at the intersection of politics and finance. 
It contributes to the literature in several important ways.  First, it adds to the growing body of 
literature on the effect of political connections on firm value by adding new evidence from 
firms in a country with a high level of corruption and a weak legal system. In doing so, this 
study complements the work by Fisman (2001) and Faccio (2006), who analyse the shareholder 
wealth impact of political connections through personal relationships between firms and 
politicians, and John and Mitton (2003) and Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) by providing 
evidence on crony capitalism that dominant political leaders do indeed use their power to 
benefit their families.  
Our contribution also lies in providing an insight into the effect of political connections 
in business groups. In spite of the considerable breadth and depth of research on political 
connections, there has rarely been any study on the role of business groups in the context of 
political connections. To the best of our knowledge, this is a first study that differentiates 
political connections at the firm level from the business group level, and provides strong 
evidence of a “spill over” effect of political connections within business groups.  
This research also contributes to the literature on the economic value of marriages and 
social networks. Family networks can be especially valuable to firms in countries where legal 
institutions are weak (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Burkart, Panunzi, and 
Shleifer, 2003). In particular, our finding corroborates the recent study by Bunkanwanicha, Fan 
and Wiwattanakantng (2013) who present the first empirical evidence showing that the 
marriage of a member of the controlling family adds value to public corporations, especially 
when the partner is from a prominent political or business family. 
Finally, our line of inquiry helps to put together a major puzzle about chaebols: if 
minority shareholders in member firms know that the controlling shareholder would 
expropriate their wealth (Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2002; Baek, Kang, and Lee, 2006), why are they 
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still willing to buy securities in these firms? One answer that we provide in this research is that 
all investors, including outside minority investors, of chaebol firms are the main beneficiaries 
of political connections. Additionally, we provide evidence that the benefits of political 
connections “spill over” from the firm with direct connections to other member firms (indirect 
connections).  
 
1.4 Thesis Layout 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review 
of the extant literature on the topic of political connections. Chapter 3 describes the institutional 
framework of the Korean political economy, which sets the backdrop for this study. Chapter 4 
develops the research hypotheses, followed by Chapter 5 which describes the data and research 
method. Chapter 6 presents the empirical results. Chapter 7 concludes.  
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate political connections are prevalent around the world. Prior evidence suggests 
that political ties affect corporate value not only in developing markets, but also in developed 
economies (Faccio, 2006). However, it is difficult to interpret empirical evidence across 
countries due to differences in the level of economic development, legal protection and 
enforcement, and institutional and regulatory frameworks including corporate governance 
practices. Accordingly, it is conceivable that the form and value of corporate political 
connections would vary across countries.  
In this literature review, we focuses on two different forms of political connections − 
explicit and implicit ties between politicians and corporations. Especially, we call attention to 
the question what decisively differentiates between explicit ties from implicit ties, and which 
of these represents a more durable and reliable measurement of political connection.   
Political connections are crucial for both corporations and politicians because they enable 
both the firms and politicians to achieve their goals. Essential to the notion of political 
connection is a systematic exchange of favours between politicians and the connected firms. 
We explore this mechanism with two important questions: i) what are motivations leading to 
the establishment of the connection between both politicians and firms? and ii) do connections 
add to company value? We provide a comprehensive review of theoretical and empirical 
evidence in relation to these questions, centering around various political interventions that 
positively or negatively influence firm value and performance.  
In what follows, this study also points out how political connection can exacerbate the 
potential conflicts of interest between managers/controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders. In the context of agency problems, political connection can be a form of 
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perquisite consumption by top managers or controlling shareholders (Aggarwal, Meschke, and 
Wang, 2009). Political ties can therefore impose costs outside minority shareholders. We 
provide empirical evidence in support of this argument, which suggests that political 
connection may have an important role in corporate governance practices. 
Lastly, we discuss the method used in the literature to measure the net effect of political 
connection. Many studies use changes in stock return to capture the net impact of political 
connection, and analyse the variation in the market reaction to different political events across 
countries. We highlight the evidence on the effect of political connections as well as the extent 
of political connectedness. For example, the stock price response to connection differs across 
politicians, firms and countries.  
This review is organized as follows. Section 2.2 clarifies different measures of political 
connection and their relative importance. Section 2.3 deals with the benefits and costs of 
political ties. Section 2.4 presents the empirical evidence to exhibit the variation in market 
reactions to different political events across countries. Section 2.5 provides a summary and 
conclusion.   
 
2.2 Definition of Political Connection 
As the outset, it is imperative to clarify the definition of political connection in prior 
literature. Corporate political connection can take many forms. As the precise form varies 
across firms and countries, it is challenging to identify and define a viable measure of political 
connection. Regulatory environment such as disclosure regulations or restriction on ownership 
or board membership by politicians differ across countries. The challenge is not made easier 
by the limited information necessary to identify the politician who is connected to the firm. 
Further, the instruments for campaign contribution are not observable for all countries. 
Campaign contribution being a common means to identify firm connections with politician or 
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political parties. This lack of data often limits the sample size and provides an incomplete 
picture of political associations. For example, Faccio (2006) excludes many interesting 
connections in her international sample such as those involving several companies connected 
to Indonesian president Suharto, who is the primary source of political connection for an earlier 
study by Fisman (2001).4   
The literature generally focuses on firms that establish a specific connection with 
politicians. These connections are often classified as either explicit or implicit. Explicit 
connections are often characterized as personal ties between politicians and businessmen, and 
implicit connections are financial ties identified from tracking the firm’s contribution to 
politicians. For example, an explicit connection arises when a politician joins the firm or its 
board of directors or becomes a large shareholder in the firm (e.g., Fisman, 2001; Khwaja and 
Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006; Fisman, Fisman, Galef, and Khurana, 2006; Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 
2007; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2008). Historical friendships are also recognized as another 
form of explicit political ties.5 Implicit connections arise when a company makes political 
donations to the politicians’ election campaign (e.g., Roberts, 1990; Jayachandran, 2006; 
Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008; Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang, 2009; Cooper, Gulen, 
and Ovtchinikov, 2010).  
Political connections identified via personal ties are likely to be more durable than those 
related to contributions to politicians. One reason why firms establish connections with 
politicians is to influence the political process in ways that can enhance firm performance. 
Explicit connections have an important role in this political intervention. Politicians may sit on 
                                                 
4 Fisman (2001) identifies politically connected firms based on the Suharto Dependency Index developed by the 
Castle Group, which is a leading economic consultant in Indonesia. The index ranges from one (least dependent 
connections) to five (most dependent connections). Faccio (2006) includes only groups rated five in her definition 
of connections. 
5 Some members of the business elite have long-standing relationships with political official in many countries. 
For instance, President Suharto maintained close relations with business people who assisted early in his career 
in Indonesia during the 1990s (Fisman, 2001; Leuz and Oberholzer, 2006). At the same time, there are long-
standing relationships between corporate leaders and leading politicians and some of these relationship were 
established when they were in early age (Johnson and Mitton. 2003). 
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corporate boards or businessman can decide to go into politics. Hence, businessman in power 
may be able to influence legislation, gather privileged information, or even influence 
government expenditures in a way that is favourable to their firm. Most of all, personal 
relationships between politicians and businessmen tend to develop into long-term relationships 
until the removal of the connection due to say the death of the connected politicians (Fisman, 
2001; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006).  
The literature offers two views of political donations. First, contributions to politicians 
represent an investment in political capital. Firms that donate money to politicians appear to 
obtain better quality and more frequent access to politicians (Langbein and Lotwis, 1990; 
Krozszner and Stratmann, 1998). Many studies show that political donations are positively 
associated with firm value and performance (Roberts, 1990; Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 
2008; Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinikov, 2010). In contrast, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and 
Snyder (2003) suggest that political contributions should be regarded primarily as a type of 
consumption good, since contributors obtain relatively little leverage from their contribution. 
Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2009) also find no evidence to support that contributions 
represent an investment, arguing that political donations mostly establish short-term and 
transactional relationships. Thus, political contributions may not process in the same way or 
have the same impact as political connections established through personal ties. The literature 
also leaves open an important question of how contributions and connections are related to 
each other, e.g., whether firms contribute to politicians whose intrinsic view is aligned with the 
interest of the firms or whether contributions influence politicians’ behaviour.  
Other research takes an alternative approach by defining connections through geographic 
ties. The proposition is that politicians systematically favour “local” companies similar to the 
portfolio home bias effect where  politicians or their constituencies are driven by the need for 
re-election; links between friends, local firms, and family; and concerns for local jobs. Thus, 
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geographic settings offer an influential basis for political connectedness. For example, Faccio 
and Parsley (2009) and Kim, Pantzalis, and Park (2012) focus on companies headquartered in 
the town where the politician was born or the town where the politician lived.  
 
2.3 Benefits and Costs of Political Connections 
The literature suggests that there is a systematic exchange of favours between politicians 
and the connected firms. In this quid pro quo relationship, business leaders can count on the 
politicians for help in times of needs and politicians in return receive various kinds of assistance 
from the business leaders.  
A number of papers document the economic benefits that companies can obtain from 
connections with politicians (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, Masulis and 
McConnell, 2006). Politicians can use their authority to grant favours to connected firms, and 
these political favours can come in many forms including preferential access to credit (Johnson 
and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005, Faccio, 2010); lighter taxation (Faccio, 2010); 
government contracts (Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2013); capital control (Johnson and Mitton, 
2003); regulatory protection (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998); and government aid for 
financially troubled firms (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006). In the context of the 
resource-based theory, a firm has a competitive advantage when it possesses tangible and 
intangible resources that are difficult or costly for other firms to obtain. Therefore, political 
connections are regarded as potential resources that add value to the connected firms.  
One of the most pervasive and important forms of benefits is preferential lending. In the 
literature, political connection provides firms access to resources like bank financing. It is 
crucial that firms are able to secure capital to fund future investment opportunities. So, it is 
important to establish connection with politicians or the government that can provide the firms 
with preferential access to credit from banks owned or controlled by government which may 
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also charge an interest rate often lower than the prevailing market rate (Johnson and Mitton, 
2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Charumilind, Kali, and Wiwattanakantang, 2006).  
Another way political connection can translate into preferential access to finance is 
through state banks (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008). 
Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) show that private lenders facilitate lending to 
connected firms. However, they do not rule out the possibility that the government pressure 
private banks to provide favourable loans to connected firms, consistent with the view that 
private banks show no such political bias (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Finally, Faccio (2010) 
complements and generalizes prior results from single-country analysis by a conducting a 
cross-country analysis. She finds that, on average, connected firms have 2.7% higher leverage 
than non-connected firms.  
An implication of political interference in bank loan allocation is that loan decisions can 
be insensitive to the risk and governance of the borrowing connected firms. Although 
connected firms may have an unprofitable forecast, banks are often under pressure from 
government to extend loans to them (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). This suggests that political 
connection via preferential lending can lead to increased firm value only when there is a wealth 
transfer from banks or consumers to the connected firm. In addition, political interference is 
more pronounced in countries where government control the banks, as is the case in most 
emerging countries (Dinc, 2005). This explains why the magnitude of the benefits from 
connections varies across countries, with connected firms gaining the most in countries with 
weak legal systems and high levels of corruption (Faccio, 2006). Taken together, connected 
firms can increase value if they are able to extract economic rents from competitors and citizens 
as a whole. 
Politically connected companies also gain benefits from direct government support and 
resources, including reducing regulatory requirements, lowering taxation, the awarding of 
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lucrative government contracts and the imposition of tariffs on competitors. For example, 
Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) report that politically experienced directors have important roles 
in companies that export, lobby, and sell to the government. Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2013) 
find that government procurement contracts are more likely to be allocated to firms connected 
to the winning party in the United State. Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar (2007) show 
firms with connected CEOs receive more subsidies, and enjoy, on average, lower corporate 
taxation in France. Faccio (2010) also shows that politically connected companies experience 
a lower corporate tax rate by 0.76% points, and thus benefit from lower operating costs. Overall, 
political connections provide economic advantages to firms by channelling to them key 
resources and support from the government.  
Finally, politically favoured firms are associated with lower their risk than non-connected 
firms. When faced with financial distress, political connection becomes more valuable. 
Johnson and Mitton (2003) show that imposing capital control in Malaysia during the Asian 
financial crisis attributes approximately 32% of the estimated $5 billion gain in the market 
value of politically connected firms. Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that capital controls are 
one of the most important parts of government policies in ‘‘relationship-based’’ capitalism. In 
this system, politicians make banks channel their lending towards favoured companies; this is 
easier to do if the country is relatively isolated from the international market. In this context, 
the evidence in Johnson and Mitton (2003) suggests that capital controls provide a channel 
where connected firms can be assisted.  
Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) show that private lenders facilitate lending to 
connected firms because they anticipate that government are more likely to bail out connected 
companies in financial distress or economic downturn. A consequence of the guarantee from 
political connections lowers the connected firm's overall exposure to market-wide risk. This 
drives down the covariance between the market and the connected firm’s cash flows, 
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generating a lower cost of capital for the connected firm. Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011) 
add to this evidence by showing that although the quality of earnings reported by politically 
connected firms is significantly lower than that of comparable non-connected peers, the market 
does not penalize the former since their cost of debt is lower than that of their non-connected 
counterparts. Finally, Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar (2012) complement Chaney, 
Faccio, and Parsley’s (2011) work by reporting that a lower cost of equity capital for politically 
connected companies. Therefore, these findings offer strong evidence that investors require a 
lower cost of capital for connected companies, suggesting that connected firms are regarded as 
less risky than non-connected firms. 
In contrast, political connections can impose costs on the connected firms. For example, 
the incumbent politicians can use their power to influence business leaders to make corporate 
decisions that bestow favour affecting re-election outcomes for themselves. Hence connected 
companies may have to devote tremendous resources to politicians’ rent-seeking extraction, 
which in turn may distort their own investment decisions and firm value. A number of papers 
document that rent-seeking activities are the main reason for government intervention (Stigler, 
1971; De Soto, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000) find 
connected firms in Canada exhibit lower industry-adjusted operating performance, labor 
capital ratios, and R&D costs relative to non-connected peers. Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and 
Thesmar (2007) add to this evidence by showing that connected firms in politically contested 
areas exhibit lower stock performance and rates of return on assets (ROA) than non-connected 
firms, especially during the election years in France. They explain that this lower profitability 
is due to connected CEOs having to create more jobs to secure more supporting votes for the 
connected politicians.  
Numerous studies find that political connections are more prevalent in larger firms 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2008; 
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Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov, 2010; Faccio, 2010; Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra, and 
Saffar, 2012). This is not surprising since politicians gain the most (in terms of maximising 
their policy goals) from granting favours to large firms. Consequently, the cost of political 
connection is when affiliated politicians extract political or private benefits from other 
stakeholders in the firms. However, Faccio (2004) argues that the rent–seeking activities by 
politicians cannot explain fully the overall underperformance of connected firms.  
The cost of political connections can be exemplified in corporate governance. Politically 
connected companies care less about governance, which is important for external capital raising, 
due to their privileged access to loans from banks controlled by government (Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008). The reduced reliance on external 
financing means that important external monitoring by the market is avoided. Chaney, Faccio, 
and Parsley (2011) show that the quality of accounting information of politically connected 
firms is poorer than that of non-connected peers because of advantages of having political ties 
in the debt market. This evidence suggests that political intervention can weaken managerial 
practices, leading to worse corporate governance. Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2009) find 
that firms with better corporate governance, such as the separation of CEO and chairman, 
smaller boards, and larger ownership by insiders, blockholders, and financial institutions, are 
less likely to be connected, arguing that political ties represent a symptomatic agency problem.  
As political connection represents an agency problem, it can be considered as a perquisite 
consumption by top directors or controlling shareholders (Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang, 
2009). In this perspective, political connection subtracts from corporate value as it represents 
a cash outflow without any corresponding benefit to minority shareholders. Boubakri, 
Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar (2012) show firms with connected boards do not have 
managerial incentives that maximize minority shareholders’ wealth. Fan, Wong, Zhang (2007) 
find that firms with politically connected CEOs show a lower degree of professionalism and 
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have poorer three-year post-IPO earnings growth, sales growth, and returns on sales. In 
addition, Qian, Pan, and Yeung (2011) report that political connections, especially those that 
secure bank loan access, affect the incentive of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders through self-dealing and tunnelling, resulting in lower performance by connected 
firms. This evidence is consistent with the perspective by Lemmon and Lins (2003) that 
controlling shareholders expropriate minority shareholders.  
When firms benefit economically from political favours, these benefits should be 
factored in firm fundamentals, such as increased profitability, creating positive net present 
value. Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) find a positive and significant relationship 
between political connection and future profitability as measured by the rate of return on equity 
(ROE). Their results are consistent with Faccio and Parsley (2009) who show that connected 
firms experience a significant decrease in sales growth when the connection terminates due to, 
for instance, the sudden death of the connected politician.  
In contrast, when politically connected firms experience poor performance, it may be due 
to the high level of rent–seeking activities by politicians and/or agency problem faced by the 
connected firms. However, it is also possible that the connected firms are simply ex ante bad 
performers − these firms are more likely to build political connection as they have more to gain 
from the connection (Faccio and Parsley, 2009; Faccio, 2010; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 
2006). The question of whether political connection leads to poor performance remains 
unanswered in the literature.  
Political connection is thus a double-edged sword that can either enhance or jeopardize 
a company’s value and performance. As noted by Shleifer and Vishny (1994), the net effect of 
political ties is determined by the difference between marginal benefits and marginal costs of 
the connections. In equilibrium, connected firms may not obtain higher profits although they 
can earn substantial political benefits if they were willing to devote to the cost of rent-seeking 
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activities by politicians. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that politicians have the capability 
to extract most or all of the rents from lenders, borrowers, and other stakeholders so they can 
become the ultimate net beneficiaries of political connections. Most of all, when all or more of 
the increase in firm value is consumed by politicians and their connected managers or 
controlling shareholders, less of the remaining value is available to minority shareholders.  
It is difficult to measure the net effect of political connections directly. Many studies use 
the stock price reaction as a proxy for the net impact of political connection. However, it is 
hard to maintain that the positive stock response to the announcement of political events itself 
is a signal that the government will start to implement policies that are favourable to the 
connected firms. Therefore, the effect of political connection on corporate value is more likely 
to be derived from investors’ belief and perception of the value that these connections can 
bestow on the firms (Claessens, Fijen, and Laeven, 2008). If the perceived marginal benefits 
of political ties exceed the marginal costs, then the connection will lead to an increase in the 
equity value of the connected firm.  
 
2.4 Stock Market Reaction to Political Connections 
There is a growing body of evidence showing that political ties affect corporate value. 
Some cross-country and country-specific studies find that the equity value of politically 
connected firms is sensitive to political events such as the establishment or the termination of 
political connections. The main argument is that investors are able to price ex ante the value of 
such connection, which is reflected in the stock price around the announcement of a nomination, 
election, or other political events. For example, a number of papers that take a short-term event-
study approach find the removal of connections leads to a decrease in equity value (Roberts, 
1990; Fisman, 2001; Faccio and Parsley, 2009), while the establishment of  connection 
22 
 
generates an increase in equity value (Faccio, 2006; Claessens, Fijen, and Laeven, 2008; 
Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2008).  
The termination of political connection affects the stock price of connected firms 
negatively. Roberts (1990) tests the effect of Senator Henry Jackson’s sudden death on the U.S. 
stock market. The announcement of the death negatively affects the share price of firms that 
made campaign contributions to Senator Jackson, while firms connected to his successor 
experience a positive abnormal return. However, the effect of Senator Jackson’s sudden death 
is quite small, implying that the small response suggests that this particular political connection 
only provided a small benefit. Therefore, although Robert (1990) provides direct evidence that 
connections have an influence on firm value, it does not give a convincing answer to the 
question how much do connections matter to firm value.  
Fisman (2001) answers this question in his study. He estimates the value of political 
connectedness by examining stock price reactions of companies related to Indonesian President 
Suharto in response to rumors that his infirmity was worsening during his final year in office. 
He finds that the stock price response of connected firms is larger when the rumor is more 
negative. The results suggest that a considerable part of the value of connected firms stems 
from political connection. However, one problem associated with focusing on events is that the 
full value of the connection cannot be estimated in the absence of actual sudden regime shifts. 
To estimate the full value of political connection in this instance would require the occurrence 
of an event that is associated with Suharto’s sudden termination from office.  
The studies described above provide independent evidence that political connections 
create value to connected firms. However, as these studies use only a small sample, their results 
may understate the true value of the connection and are thus not generalizable. To overcome 
this problem, Faccio (2006) and Faccio and Parsley (2009) use a cross-country analysis. 
Faccio’s (2006) complements the work of Fisman (2001). She finds the market value of firms 
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with political connection is affected by unexpected electoral outcomes in a broad cross-section 
of 35 countries. The result shows that the announcement of officers or large shareholders 
entering into politics significantly increases the value of connected firms; connection through 
large shareholders and officers results in a five-day CAR of 4.47% and 2.29% respectively. 
Faccio and Parsley (2009) also use unanticipated events represented by the sudden death of 
incumbent politicians. They report an average decline in the value of connected companies by 
1.7% (market-adjusted) in response to 122 sudden deaths of politicians from around the world 
between 1973 and 2004. Especially interesting is the finding that all connections including 
personal, financial, and geographical have a similar magnitude of impact on firm value, 
suggesting that the various forms of political connections are equally economically significant 
(Roberts, 1990; Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Faccio and Parsley, 2009).  
More recent studies show similar results that political connections are valuable to 
shareholders. Claessens, Fijen, and Laeven (2008) find that political donations are associated 
with higher stock returns around the date of election, suggesting that investors predict future 
political favours to connected firms. In addition, Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008) analyse 
stock price reactions to the announcement of board nomination of a politically connected 
director. They find a positive abnormal stock return around the announcement. Although 
connections appear to be important to investors, most of these studies silent investigate the 
exact source of the positive stock reaction. Only Faccio and Parsley (2009) and Claessens, 
Fijen, and Laeven (2008) find evidence that preferential access to credit is positively associated 
with abnormal returns.  
In contrast, some studies in the United States find intriguing results. Paralleled to 
Robert’s (1990) study, Fisman, Fisman, Galef and Khurana (2006), Jayachandran (2006), and 
Acemoglu, Johnson, Kermani, Kwak, and Mitton (2010) use news and events related to 
prominent American politicians. They show that Geithner-connected financial firms 
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experience an average CAR of 15% around the announcement (from day 0 to day 10) of 
Timothy Geithner as President Obama’s nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008. 
The result is consistent with the value-adding view, but the magnitude is much higher than 
previous findings. However, Jayachandran (2006) finds much lower effects. She uses corporate 
soft money donation to proxy how much corporations are aligned with political parties. She 
reports that in response to Senator Jim Jeffords switching parties in May 2001, which gave the 
Democrats power to take over the chairmanships of the Senate committees and other leadership 
positions and gained influence over the legislative agenda, confirmation of Presidential 
appointees, and more. With this move, connected firms lose on average 0.8% of market value 
for every $250,000 they contribute to the Republicans in the previous election cycles. 
Paralleling the earlier literature that uses the health status of leaders (Fisman, 2001) as a shock 
to connections, Fisman, Fisman, Galef, and Khurana (2006) examine unexpected changes in 
Cheney’s health as a shock to the value of connections. Contrary to conventional expectation, 
the value of connections to Cheney is estimated as zero.  
However, some studies show that political connections may indeed decrease shareholders’ 
wealth. Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) find that politically connected firms experience three-
year post-IPO stock returns of -18% relative to those without connections. The negative effect 
of CEO’s political connections also appears in the first-day stock return. For announcements 
of politicians to a board, Faccio (2006) finds that connected firms experience an average CAR 
of -0.53%. She interprets this result as implying that, for this subsample of announcements, the 
cost of connections may exceed the benefits due to rent-seeking activities by politicians. 
However, Faccio (2006) and Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) do not show the source of the 
negative impact.  
Prior studies have not only provided evidence on the impact of political connections but 
also exhibit the extent of political connections. Studies document that the stock price reactions 
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on political connections depend on politician-, firm-, and country-specific factors. First, the 
response is greater for family firms (Faccio and Parsley, 2009). This implies that political 
connection has a more important role for family firms than other firms, consistent with family 
firms being the likely candidate for establishing political ties (Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 
2000; Morck and Yeung, 2004), and connected family firms caring less about market 
punishment than their counterparts (Chaney, Faccio and Parsley, 2011). Second, the price 
effect is more pronounced for larger companies (Claessens, Fijen, and Laeven, 2008; Goldman, 
Rocholl and So, 2008). Third, the stronger the political links, the greater the stock price 
response. For example, Faccio (2006) finds the stock price response to a new connection is 
larger when businessmen take on more powerful political positions. Fourth, stock reactions are 
particularly greater in countries with a high level of corruption and a weak legal system (Faccio, 
2006; Faccio and Parsley, 2009). 
Overall, the existing results on the value of political connection are intriguing. A number 
of papers document a stock price response to shifts in the political landscape, and that this 
response is larger in countries with a higher level of corruption (Faccio and Parsley, 2009), and 
in larger companies, family firms, and firms with stronger political power.  However, despite 
extensive robustness checks of causality in prior literature, the endogeneity of political 
connections remains a thorny issue. Even in the best event-study setup with perfect measures 
of prior probabilities of events, it is difficult to rule out the possibility of unobserved firm 
characteristics affecting both a firm’s outcome and political connections. In addition, results 
from prior studies may be hard to generalize because they are based on short-term isolated 
events.  
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2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
It is challenging to provide a complete picture of political connections due to different 
regulatory environments and limited access to useful information across countries. These 
constraints often limit the size and bias in the sample of political connections. In the literature, 
corporate political connections tend to be personal, financial, or geographic. When politicians 
join the firm or its board of directors or become large shareholders, it leads to a long-term 
personal association between the politicians and businessmen until the removal of the 
connection. The literature suggests that this association has an important role in political 
intervention which can enhance firm value and performance.  
Financial ties are identified by tracking down firms’ contribution to politicians. Some 
researchers suggest that contribution to politicians represents an investment in political capital 
so that it is positively linked with firm value and performance. Others argue that political 
donations should be considered as a sort of consumption good as it leads to transactional and 
short-term relationship. Taken together, the personal association between politicians and 
businessmen represents a more explicit connection than political donations.           
When companies establish connections with politicians, there is a systematic exchange 
of favours between them. Business leaders can count on the politicians for help in time of needs 
and politicians in return receive various kinds of assistance from the business leaders. Many 
studies show that connected firms can gain various economic advantages through political 
intervention including preferential access to credit, lighter taxation, and government contracts. 
Political interference in the allocation of government resource or bank loan allocation is often 
insensitive to firm governance and risk, potentially resulting in the firms extracting unfair 
economic rents at the expense of their competitors and consumers. When faced with financial 
distress or economic downturn, politically connected managers can obtain government support 
through bailouts or capital control, which in turn reduce the firms’ overall exposure to market-
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wide risk. Investors therefore require a lower cost of capital for connected companies. In short, 
political connection benefits the connected firms. 
However, political connections can impose costs on corporations due to potential 
conflicts of interest between firms and politicians. In order to purse social objectives of policy 
goals or private gains such bestowing favour affecting re-election outcomes, politicians can 
extract political or private benefits at the expense of the connected firms. Connected companies 
may be compelled to devote substantial resources to rent-seeking activities by politicians that 
distort investment decisions or misallocate resources for firms. Consequently, the burden of 
implementing political policy is a channel through which connections adversely affect 
corporate value and performance. Many studies support the presence of rent-seeking activities 
as showing that politically connected firms experience poor operating performance. But it is 
also possible that the companies are simply ex ante bad performers with these type of 
companies being more likely to establish political ties. The literature leaves unanswered the 
question whether political connection leads to poor performance for connected firms. 
Some studies insist that minority shareholders are the ultimate victims of political 
connections. When connected firms can afford not to pay attention to market punishment due 
to the guarantee they receive from politicians, it can weaken managerial practices. In this 
context, top managers or controlling shareholders have incentives to transfer increased 
(decreased) wealth generated by political intervention from minority shareholders (themselves) 
to themselves (minority shareholders). As a result, connected firms can suffer from relatively 
severe agency problem, suggesting that political connections may have a crucial role in 
corporate governance practices.  
To measure the net effect of political connection, many studies document the variation 
in stock market reactions to different political events across countries. The main argument is 
that investors have the capability to value such connections, and this is reflected in the stock 
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price around the announcement of nominations, elections, or other political events. Some cross-
country and country-specific evidence shows that the removal of a connection results in a 
decline in equity value, while the establishment of connection generates an increase in equity 
value. However, some studies insist that political connections have no value or are even 
harmful to shareholders. In addition, studies also document that the stock price response of 
connections varies across firms, politicians, and countries. The quantitative effect is greater in 
countries with a high level of corruption and a weak legal system, and in larger and family 
firms. However, the results may be difficult to generalize because the empirical evidence is 
based on short-term isolated events. Most of all, it is hard to argue that the positive stock 
response to the political event itself is a signal that the connected firms start materializing the 
benefits from the connection. The evidence is more likely to indicate the market’s belief that 
the political intervention is favourable to the firms.  
In conclusion, the question of whether or not political connections enhance firm value 
has intriguing answers. Political connection is indeed a double-edged sword; it can either 
enhance or jeopardize a firm’s value and performance.  
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Chapter 3 
The Institutional Setting 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the institutional setting of the Korean political economy, which sets 
the backdrop for this research. It is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the political 
system, and Section 3.3 highlights the prevalence of business groups, and the historical 
relationship between chaebols and government. Section 3.4 summarizes the chapter.  
 
3.2 The Political System in Korea 
We give a brief overview of the political and electoral system in Korea. Korea uses a 
hybrid system combining elements of both presidential and parliamentary democracy where a 
president and a prime minister coexist with both presidential and legislative elections held 
nationally (Julio and Yook, 2012). The Korean government is divided into three branches: 
executive, legislative, and judicial. The executive branch consists of the president and ministers, 
and is headed by the president who is vested with supreme executive control and power to 
propose legislation to the National Assembly.  
The president is the chief executive of Korea and is the only elected member in the 
executive branch with a single five-year tenure by plurality vote, while the ministers are 
appointed by the president and serve up to 2 years. The Prime Minister is also appointed by the 
president and is the principal executive assistant to the President by supervising ministries. The 
Council, which consists of the president, the prime minister, and 16 cabinet-level ministers, is 
charged with deliberating on major policy decisions. The National Assembly represents the 
legislative branch of Korea. There are 299 elected members who are elected every four years 
through a supplementary member system. Local governments are semi-autonomous, and hold 
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executive and legislative bodies of their own. The local election is held every four years for 
seven mayoral and nine gubernatorial seats. 
Unlike the United States, which has a two-party system, Korea has a multi-party system. 
For example, there are seven political parties represented in the 18th National Assembly of 
Korea. The Conservative Party consists of Grand National Party (GNP), Liberty Forward Party 
(LFP), and Pro-Park Coalition (PPC). Democratic United Party (DUP) and Creative Korea 
Party (CKP) compose the Liberal party. The Progressive Party is made up of Democratic Labor 
Party (DLP) and New Progressive Party (NPP). However, the National Assembly is effectively 
dominated by two single parties: GNP and DUP, which represent the Conservative and the 
Liberal Party respectively. In the 18th National Assembly, GNP holds a majority of seats (153), 
and DUP holds 81 seats. 
 
Table 3.1 
List of Presidents and National Assembly of Korea 
Panel A. President by time in office   
Tenure Position Name     
1993-1997 Conservative Kim Young-sam   
1998-2002 Liberal Kim Dae-jung   
2003-2007 Liberal Roh Moo-hyun   
2008-2012 Conservative Lee Myung-bak     
     
Panel B. National Assembly       
 Ruling Party Major Opposition 
 Term Position Party Position Party 
15th (1996) Conservative 
New Korea Party 
(Grand National Party) 
Liberal United Liberal Democrats 
16th (2000) Conservative Grand National Party Liberal United Liberal Democrats 
17th (2004)  Liberal Woori Party Conservative Grand National Party 
18th (2008) Conservative Grand National Party Liberal United Democratic Party 
 
Traditionally, two major parties from the Conservatives and the Liberals represent the 
Korean politics. However, the Conservatives play a central role in the government for most of 
31 
 
time through history. For example, as shown in Table 3.1, all elected presidents have been from 
the Conservatives before 1997 and the Conservative Party maintains their ruling position 
except in the 17th National Assembly. In the next section, we provide a historical perspective 
on the relationship between politics and business, in particular, in the presence of chaebols.   
 
3.3 Business Groups in Korea 
Chaebols were the creation of the Conservative government of Park in the 1960s in order 
to boost the economy and to pursue their political goals. The Park government maintained its 
political legitimacy mostly through chaebols (Albrecht, Turnbull, Zang, and Skousen, 2010). 
The relationship between the government and chaebols is consistent with the notion that family 
connections to politicians allow connected firms access to substantial resources when the 
government plays a central role in the economy (Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 2000). The 
Park government preferred to deal with a handful of founding families in chaebols for obvious 
control reasons and made them enter risky undertakings. In return, the government supported 
chaebols and granted exclusive rights in profitable industries and monopolistic access to 
resources, including preferential lending, lower taxation, import and export licences, and 
foreign investment incentives and exchange allocations (Kang, 2002).  
In particular, the chairman (Chung Ju-Young) of Hyundai Group and the chairman (Kim 
Woo-Jung) of Daewoo Group had close personal links with the former president Park, and have 
received extensive government support in the form of preferential foreign loans at low interest 
rates and domestic loans from government-controlled banks (Kang, 2002). The Park 
government also fostered the development of Hyundai Group by using tariff barriers on the 
industrial sector where Hyundai Group and other chaebols operated, resulting in Hyundai 
Group maintaining its position as the biggest chaebol in Korea until the 1997 financial crisis 
(Bloomberg, 2013).  
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Under the government’s initiative, chaebols soon dominated the Korean economy (Kang, 
2002). As chaebols diversified and expanded into various industries, founding families relied 
on a complex web of cross-shareholding to sustain their managerial control over the entire 
group, similar to the cross-holding web in keiretsu (Chang, 2003). However, chaebol and 
keiretsu can be distinguished in the following aspects. While Keiretsu has access to credit 
through direct ownership of banks, which play a central role in Japan, this is not the case of 
chaebols in Korea. Restrictions on ownership of banks in Korea call for “a separation between 
financial capital and industrial capital”. Thus, chaebols rely on the state-controlled banking 
sector for external financing, and this easily allows the government to control chaebols.  
During the 1980s, although the government and chaebols still endured an interdependent 
relationship,6 the rapid growth of chaebols became a burden to the Korean economy policy. 
For the government, chaebols have become too large to control. Many chaebols became 
financially independent of the government because of the operation of an internal capital 
market within the group. When the government liberalized the Korean financial market, 
chaebols started to increase their ownership of non-bank financial intermediaries (Shin and 
Park, 1999). Moreover, criticisms of unfair trade practices that favour chaebols were abound.  
To address this concern, the government created laws and institutions to regulate the 
concentration of economic power by chaebols. In 1986, the Korean Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC), 7  whose role was to monitor chaebols, introduced a system that ranks chaebols 
according to their total assets annually. The Fair Trade Act was revised to restrict cross-
shareholdings of intra-group affiliates in chaebols. As a result, to maintain their discretionary 
                                                 
6 Under the Roh regime, the former president Roh Tae-Woo had marriage alliances through siblings of political 
and bureaucratic elites and that of chaebol. Roh’s son and daughter married into leading chaebol families (SK 
Group, the third biggest chaebol in 2008). The influence of these relationship quickly became a key factor in 
economic and industrial policy through the Roh regime, including the government’s decision to lower interest 
rates to chaebols at the beginning of 1991 (Cotton, 1995).  
7 The Korea Fair Trade Commission is a quasi-judicial regulatory agency and enforces The Fair Trade Act. The 
Commission is established under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister for the purpose of independently promoting 
the objectives of the Act.  
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power, founding families in chaebols increased their political influence by increasing their 
continuous supply of illegal funds to politicians (Noland and Pack, 2003). This way, chaebols 
have gathered more centralized control than Japanese keiretsu (Shin and Park, 1999), and 
results in a weakening of the corporate governance of chaebols.  
In 1997, Asia entered into one of its most devastating crises, the Asian Financial Crisis. 
At that time, listed firms belonging to the top 30 chaebols accounted for 45.8% of total market 
capitalization, 62.5% of the total assets, and 72.6% of gross sales of all firms listed on the 
Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) (Chang, 2003). Despite their significant economic size, the 
inefficiency of chaebols has been questioned. Lee and Kim (2000) and Joh (2003) find that 
chaebol affiliates underperform non-chaebol firms in the mid-1990s. Ferris, Kim, and 
Kitsabunnarart (2003) explain the loss in value of chaebol firms is consistent with the 
overinvestment view by Stulz (1990), i.e., an overinvestment in lines of business that have poor 
investment prospects adversely influences the value of diversified firms. Such evidence is a far 
outcry from the early study by Chang and Choi (1988), which credits chaebols with higher 
profitability than non-chaebol firms in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The Conservative Party and chaebols were blamed for the 1997 economic downturn,8 
and this has resulted in candidate Kim Dae-jung (1998- 2002) winning the 1997 election as the 
first president from the Liberal party. With the change in the political regime from the 
Conservatives to the Liberals, a major shift in the respective powers of government and 
chaebols occurred. In 1999, the Kim regime allowed Daewoo Group, which is the second 
biggest chaebol in Korea, to fail. The allowed bankruptcy of Daewoo Group changed the 
perception that chaebols are "too big to fail” is no longer valid. The Kim regime reformed 
                                                 
8 Causes of the 1997 financial crisis in Korea have been substantially investigated. Jwa and Lee (2004) trace the 
causes to an inefficient financial sector that was afflicted with moral hazard, lack of transparency in business 
operations, excessive diversification of chaebols via debt financing, low productivity and loss of international 
competitiveness, and rigid labour market practices. These are directly related to government intervention.  
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chaebols with the aim to improve their financial transparency and corporate governance 
structure.9  
In particular, the separation between ownership and voting rights by the founding 
families in chaebols has been criticised as the cause of weakening corporate governance in 
chaebols (Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2002). As La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) 
argue, ownership is heavily concentrated in most business groups and controlling shareholders 
have control over member firms that exceed their cash flow rights. Through stock pyramids, 
dual-class share structure, and cross-shareholdings, chaebol families have full power over all 
member firms despite holding a relatively small portion of the total shares in the group 
(Almeida, Park, Subrahmanyam, and Wolfenzon, 2011). All major strategic and financial 
decisions of each affiliate lie in the hands of the founding family, rather than professional 
management (Shin and Park, 1999).  
Thus, consistent with the tunnelling view of Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003) and 
Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002), the controlling families with concentrated 
ownership can easily expropriate minority investors by transferring resources from member 
firms to other member firms within the same group in order to maximise their own private 
benefits. For example, Bae, Kang, and Kim, (2002) provide direct evidence of tunnelling in 
which the controlling shareholders of chaebols have incentives to transfer resources from firms 
where they have low cash flow rights to firms where they have high cash flow rights through 
acquisitions. Baek, Kang, and Lee (2006) also support the view of tunnelling within business 
groups by showing chaebol issuers in intra-group deals set the offering price in order to increase 
their controlling shareholders’ wealth. 
                                                 
9 The Kim government implemented a policy to reform chaebols that emphasizes on the following four aims: i) 
chaebols are encouraged to hire professional managers in order to decentralize the founding families’ involvement 
in management; ii) chaebols are pressured to focus on core businesses rather than further diversification; iii) 
accounting regulations are revised to improve transparency in operation of chaebols; and iv) inheritance taxes and 
antitrust laws were introduced to loosen the founding families’ control over chabols. 
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To loosen families’ control, the Kim government reintroduced the “equity investment 
sum caption rule” to restrict the total sum of intra-corporate investment by chaebols in 1999. 
This regulation does not allow chaebols to invest more than 25% of their net assets in group 
affiliates. In 2000, chaebols were also required to unravel cross debt guarantees among 
affiliates within the same group.  
The reform targeted at chaebols continued into the new government, when Roh Moo-
hyun (2003-2007) from the Liberal Party became the 9th president. Through the April 2004 
general election, the Woori Party became the first Liberal Party ruling the National Assembly 
in history. More recently, the Roh regime and the Liberal Party tried to undertake policies such 
as the alleviation of economic concentration and restrictions against chaebols. For instance, the 
Roh government reintroduced the Korean Fair Trade Commission to monitor chaebol's bank 
accounts for evidence of illegal inter-subsidiary dealings and illegal political funding. The 
revision of the Financial Industry Structure Law (FISL) of the Fair Trade Act proposed by the 
Roh regime and the Liberal Party in 2005 was one of the most controversial political issues 
involving all key players – the government, political parties, and business. The FISL limits 
conglomerates' voting rights in their financial firms to 15 per cent from 30 per cent. This 
regulation was finally complied in April 2006 session of the National Assembly, despite 
criticisms by the conservative Grand National Party which supports business groups.  
Despite these restrictions under the Kim and the Roh regime, the dominance of founding 
families still remains in the management of major chaebols, and the extent of chaebol cross-
shareholding also remains high. According to KFTC, total ownership by the owner and her 
family was less than 5%, but cross-shareholdings of affiliates accounted for approximately 44% 
in 2006. In particular, because a controlling family often funnels control over this pyramid or 
cross-shareholdings through a privately owned firm, it is very difficult for outside shareholders 
to exert any influence on the ownership structure in chaebols. Failure to tame controlling 
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families would mean that chaebols will remain the crucial drivers of the Korean economy, with 
each of them controlling numerous listed and unlisted companies.  
On the political scene, the Roh regime encountered strong opposition from the 
Conservatives. During the Roh government, the Korean economy suffered low economic 
growth. The Conservatives accused the Roh regime and the Liberals of incompetence on Roh’s 
policies. Consistent with rising criticisms of president Roh and the Liberals, candidate Lee 
Myng-bak of the Conservative Party, GNP, won the presidential election with 48.7% of the 
votes on 19 December 2007. Lee became the 10th president of South Korea on 25 February 
2008. In the April 2008’s general election, the Conservative Party became the ruling party for 
the 18th National Assembly with 52.87% of the votes, followed by 29.34% for the Liberal 
Party.  
The presidential and general elections reinstated the Conservative Party. The shift in 
politics marks the third era for the relationship between government and chaebols. President 
Lee is particularly closely associated with chaebols. Lee’s family has marital networks with 
chaebols including LG Group and Hyosung Group. The chairman of Hyosung Gorup has taken 
the post of chairman of the Federation of Korean Industries, a consortium of chaebols, from 
2007 to 2011.10 In addition, Lee is the first president who has a business background; he was 
former CEO of chaebol affiliates in Hyundai Group before becoming a politician. The Lee 
government has implemented favourable policies which are “business friendly” to chaebols, 
such as high foreign exchange rates, low interest rates, tax cuts for large corporations, 
weakening of the separation of financial and industrial capital, and elimination of the equity 
investment limit. These changes have resulted in greater concentration and power over the 
Korean economy by chaebols while sustaining founding families’ control over chaebols.  
                                                 
10 The Federation of Korea Industries is one of the four most prestigious economic organizations in Korea and it 
consists of the Korea International Trade Association, Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Korean 
Federation of Small Business in Korea. These organizations are regarded as political pressure groups in Korea. 
The Federation of Korea Industries represents all industry sectors. 
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3.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlines the institutional framework for the Korean political economy. The 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Party represent politics in Korea. The Conservative Party 
has traditionally maintained a close relationship with chaebols, while the opposing Liberal 
Party is often against chaebols. In particular, the Conservatives openly supported and granted 
access to substantial resources for chaebols during the 1960s to 1980s when they maintained 
the ruling position in politics. Since the 1997 Asian crisis, a finger of blame was pointed at the 
Conservative Party and chaebols. This has led to a major shift in power from the Conservative 
Party to the Liberal Party. During the period 1998 to 2007, the Liberal Party undertook policies 
that aim to alleviate economic concentration of chaebols by imposing various restrictions on 
them. The economic turmoil under the Liberal Party resulted in the reinstatement of the 
Conservative Party at the 2007 presidential and 2008 general elections. This shift in politics 
marked the third era for the relationship between government and chaebols in Korea, and thus 
provides an ideal setting to investigate the impact of political connections in the presence of 
powerful business groups.  
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Chapter 4 
Hypotheses  
4.1 Introduction 
Large and family-owned business groups, known as chaebols, are prevalent in Korea 
with operations across a wide range of industries (Bae, Kang and Kim, 2002; Ferris, Kim, and 
Kitsabunnarart, 2003). The average number of member firms including private and public 
companies in the top 30 chaebols is 26.8 in 1997. The minimum and maximum number of 
affiliates is 13 and 62 in Kohap Group and Hyundai Group respectively (Bae, Cheon, and Kang, 
2008). 
The economic power of chaebols is substantial. The top 30 chaebols produced about 16% 
of the country’s GDP and about 12% of total GNP in 1998 (Baek, Kang and Park, 2004). The 
Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) is dominated by these chaebols, which represent more than half 
of total market capitalization, 62.5% of total assets, and 72.6% of total gross sales of all listed 
companies (Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2002). The big five largest chaebols − Hyundai, Samsung, 
Daewoo, LG, and SK − have dominant power in the Korean economy, contributing 9% of GDP 
and 27% of manufacturing GDP in 1995 (Yoo, 1998). 
Prior studies document that large firms and family-controlled firms are more likely to 
have political connections than other types of firms. For example, politically connected firms 
in Malaysia, on average, are twice as big as unconnected firms (John and Mitton, 2003). 
Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2009) find connected firms that make more political donations 
have more assets (larger size) in the United States as well. So do Goldman, Rocholl, and So 
(2008) for a sample of S&P 500 firms in 2000 whose political connection is through board 
members. Faccio (2010)’s cross-country analysis shows the market value of equity of 
connected firms are three times larger than non-connected peers on average. Morck, Stangeland, 
and Yeung (2000, 2004) find that family ties play an important role in relation to political ties 
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and influence in Canada where family controlled companies tend to have more political 
connections and power. 
The prevalence of large business groups (chaebols) in Korea suggests the importance in 
considering them in tests of the effect of political connections in Korea. This chapter develops 
two sets of predictions about the value of political connections for both chaebols and other 
firms. These are outlined in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 provides a chapter summary. 
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
The literature suggests two competing hypotheses on the value of political connections: 
value-adding and value-destroying. Under the value-adding hypothesis, political connections 
create potential resources that can add value to connected firms. Economic benefits that firms 
can gain from the connections stem from government resources and supports. Preferential 
access to bank loans, for instance, is a common benefit that connected firms can receive from 
banks owned or controlled by government. These bank loans charge an interest rate that is 
lower than the prevailing market rate, as was observed in various countries including Brazil 
(Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008); Indonesia (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006); Malaysia 
(Johnson and Mitton, 2003); and Pakistan (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Chaney, Faccio and 
Parsley (2011) also find connected firms enjoy a lower cost of debt than comparable non-
connected peers in 19 countries.  
Other economic benefits of political connections include the awarding of profitable 
government contracts and lower taxation to connected firms, as well as imposing tariffs on 
competitors. For example, Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008) report that, after the 1994 election 
in the U.S, firms associated with the winning political party were expected to get increased 
government awarded contracts. Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar (2007) and Wu, Wu, 
and Rui (2012) find firms with politically connected managers are more successful in gaining 
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government subsidies in France and China respectively. In addition, government can give tax 
benefits to connected companies by imposing tariffs on competitors include foreign 
competitors (Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2013). According to Mobarak and Purbasari (2006), 
Indonesian firms that supported the Suharto government received systematic benefits in the 
form of import licenses, and putting their competitors at a disadvantage. In France, Bertrand, 
Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar (2007) find that firms with politically connected CEOs have on 
average lower corporate tax payments. Using a cross-county analysis, Faccio (2010) also shows 
that connected firms are taxed at a lower rate (0.76 percentage lower than non-connected firms), 
and thus benefit from lower operating costs. 
When faced with financial distress or economic downturn, political connections can also 
help connected firms to obtain government aid such as capital control or bailouts. Johnson and 
Mitton (2003) show the effect of imposing capital control in Malaysia during the Asian 
financial crisis. The government control increased the sum of the market value for politically 
connected firms by approximately $1.6 billion. Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) find 
that government bailouts can be a preferential benefit that connected firms can enjoy. In a 
cross-country analysis of the likelihood of government bailouts, they report that politically 
connected firms have a higher chance to be bailed out by the government compared to 
unconnected firms. Given the assurance of corporate bailouts in periods of financial downturn, 
Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar (2012) find that, in general, politically connected 
firms are deemed less risky than non-connected firms, as reflected by the former’s lower cost 
of capital. 
Overall, these findings suggest that political connections provide greater opportunity to 
the connected firms to obtain key resources from the government, and to lower operating costs 
and risks relative to non-connected firms.  
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In an efficient capital market, we expect investors to price these benefits derived from 
political connections. The probability of receiving these favorable outcomes may increase or 
decrease depending on the shift in the firm’s political landscape, specifically the establishment 
or the termination of its connections. We expect these outcomes to be reflected in the stock 
price on the announcement of a new connection including a nomination or election, or removal 
from the office such as the unexpected death of politicians. Therefore, the value-adding 
hypothesis predicts either positive abnormal returns around the establishment of political 
connections or negative abnormal returns around the termination of political connections. 
Conversely, since the termination of political connections implies the end of the flow of 
political benefits that may accrue to the connected firms, the value-adding hypothesis also 
predicts a negative share price reaction around the termination of the connection.   
Many studies support this argument. The establishment of a connection generates an 
increase in equity value. For a sample of 35 countries, Faccio (2006) examines how stock price 
changes in relation to a firm’s stakeholders entering government service either through an 
election or appointment. She documents an average increase in firm value of over 2% on the 
announcement in the (-2, +2) window. Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008) also find that the 
stock price reaction for politically connected firms in Brazil is significantly positive around the 
election, implying that investors predict future political favors for those firms. Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So (2008) find that the announcement of board nomination of a politically 
connected director of S&P 500 companies is associated with a positive abnormal stock. 
Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2009) find positive one-day abnormal returns to companies 
connected to the winning party in the presidential election years when they assess whether ties 
to the winning party around an election are associated with higher event-study returns. 
Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008) also report that the Republican Party’s winning of the U.S. 
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2000 presidential election led to an increase in the value of firms connected to the Republican 
Party. 
In contrast, the removal of connections leads a decrease in equity value. Fisman (2001) 
finds the Indonesian President Suharto’s debilitating health conditions result in a loss in value 
of firms connected to the Suharto regime. Roberts (1990) examines the effect of Senator Henry 
Jackson’s sudden death on the U.S. stock market. On average, while the announcement of his 
death negatively affects the share price of companies that supported Senator Jackson’s 
campaign, companies connected to his successor gain a positive abnormal return. Faccio and 
Parsley (2009) also employ the sudden death of sitting politicians as a proxy for the termination 
of connections. Their analysis reports an average market-adjusted decline in the equity value 
of connected firms by 1.7% in response to 122 sudden deaths of politicians from around the 
world between 1973 and 2004. 
Overall, cross-country and country-specific evidence suggests that political connections 
add value to connected firms. Since this study focuses only on the establishment of the 
connection, the value-adding hypothesis therefore predicts the following: 
 
H1:  Firms experience, on average, a significantly positive abnormal stock return around the 
establishment of political connections. 
 
In Korea, chaebols firms are significantly larger in size. Ferris, Kim, and Kitsabunnarart 
(2003) report that with respect to total assets and sales, chaebol firms are 10 times larger than 
non-chaebol firms. Although chaebols have significant power in the economy with its sizable 
operations, firms within a chaebol are controlled by a single family. When it comes to decision 
making, the controlling family has more influence than professional managers of the company 
(Bae, Kang, Kim, 2002). According to the Fair Trade Commission, a chairman holds on 
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average 1.95% ownership in the country's top 36 chaebols as of 1 April 2003. If the ownership 
were extended to include the chaiman’s family members, the shareholding interest increases to 
2.66%. However, the actual controlling power of the chairman’s family is 41.71% via 
complicated cross shareholdings and reciprocal shareholdings within affiliates. 
Prior studies document that the stock price reaction of political connections depends on 
firm characteristics. The value-adding of political connections is greater for larger and family-
controlled firms. For example, Faccio and Parsley (2009) find connected firms with family 
domination are more negatively affected by the death of the politician − the average price drop 
is -1.41% for a sample of 491 family connected firms compared to -0.89% for a sample of 
1,510 non family connected firms. Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008) show that the 
announcement of the board nomination of a politically connected individual leads to the trend 
that stock prices respond positively, especially among the larger companies. 
These results suggest that investors do not price the value of political connections equally 
for all connected firms. Specifically, the value-adding of political connections is greater for 
connected firms that are larger and controlled by family. Since chaebol firms are both large 
and family-controlled, we expect chaebol firms with connections to receive more benefits from 
political intervention than other firms in Korea.  
The government’s involvement in the economy suggests the important relationship 
between businessmen and public officials. This relationship can take the form of cooperation, 
or collusion and corruption, or both (You, 2005). Evans (1995) emphasizes the importance of 
collaboration between the government and business to form and implement a new policy, and 
to establish trust, leading to reduced transaction costs. Under the value-adding hypothesis, the 
close association between the government and chaebols is considered a positive collaboration, 
which allows chaebols to obtain more key resources and support from the government. Indeed, 
there is ample evidence supporting this, tracing back to the 1960s when the first chaebols were 
44 
 
created by the Conservative government of Park to boost the economy and to pursue the 
government’s political goals (Kang, 2002). In return, the government supported chaebols and 
granted them exclusive rights to profitable industries and monopolistic access to resources, 
including preferential lending, lower taxation, import and export licences, and foreign 
investment incentives and exchange allocations (Kang, 2002). More examples of the close 
relationship between chaebols and the Conservatives, which traditionally equates big business 
interest with economic growth, are described in Section 3.3.  
Overall, historical examples suggest that chaebols with connections can receive more 
benefits than other firms. Empirical evidence suggests the equity value of large and family 
firms with political connections is more sensitive to the establishment of political connections. 
The value-adding hypothesis therefore predicts the following for connected chaebols: 
 
H2: Chaebol firms experience, on average, a significantly more positive abnormal stock return 
than other firms (including connected non-chaebol firms and non-connected firms) 
around the establishment of political connections. 
 
In contrast, the value-destroying hypothesis predicts the opposite, i.e., investors associate 
political connections with rent-seeking activities by politicians to accomplish policy goals or 
their own interest by taking advantage of minority shareholders in the company. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994) in fact indicate that politicians are willing to provide subsidies to connected 
firms, but not for free. The “payback” may take the form of firms creating employment, which 
in turn increases support for the incumbent government. Similarly, Bennedsen (2000) theorises 
that in equilibrium the best policy for firms would be trading inefficient employment 
arrangements for government subsidies. 
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Conflicts of interest between shareholders and bureaucrats who oversee the firm arise 
when the latter gives priority to social objectives or private gains over the firm’s interest. Thus 
rent-seeking activities by politicians may distort investment decisions or misallocate resources 
for firms, resulting in lower firm value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, 
and Thesmar (2007) provide empirical evidence that firms with politically connected CEOs 
have higher rates of job or plant creation and lower rates of plant destruction so as to support 
votes for connected politicians in France. However, the rent seeking behavior of politicians 
results in politically connected firms exhibiting lower performance and lower rates of return 
on assets compared to firms with no connections, and this trend is most noticeable during 
election periods and in some political competition. Poor performance is therefore found despite 
connected firms receiving tax deduction and subsidies from the government. Morck, 
Stangeland, and Yeung (2000) also find that connected firms in Canada exhibit lower industry-
adjusted financial performance, R&D spending, and labour capital ratios than non-connected 
counterparts. 
Consequently, corporate political connections are costly when connected politicians try 
to pursue their own interest at the expense of other stakeholders in the firm. However, Faccio 
(2004) argues that politicians’ rent-seeking activities are not the only reason for the overall 
underperformance of politically connected firms. The literature on corporate governance 
suggests that agency and weak governance issues can plague politically connected firms, 
resulting in other value-decreasing rent-seeking activities by controlling shareholders. For 
example, Qian, Pan, and Yeung (2011) claim that it is easier for controlling owners of 
connected firms to be involved in self-dealing and tunnelling as political connections help firms 
secure bank financing and exempt them from capital market punishment.  Using an international 
sample, Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011) find that managers of connected firms are not 
worried much about improving the firm’s financial records compared to those of non-
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connected firms. In fact, Guedhami and Pittman (2006) show that lower quality accounting 
information is used to hide their illegal activities such as embezzlement and prevent monitoring 
of these activities. Wahab, How, and Verhoeven (2007) also report that political connections 
have a significantly negative effect on the quality of corporate governance in Malaysia. 
Additional supporting evidence is provided by Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011), who find 
that less accurate analyst forecasts are found in connected firms, which suggests that 
information asymmetry problems are more rampant in these firms. 
In an efficient capital market, we expect investors to price the costs of political 
connections due to the rent-seeking activities of politicians and the ensuing potential 
expropriation of shareholders that may well exceeds the benefits the firm receives from the 
connection. As political connections are negatively associated with abnormal returns around 
the establishment of political connections, the value-destroying hypothesis therefore predicts 
the following: 
 
H3:  Politically connected firms experience, on average, a significantly negative abnormal 
stock return around the establishment of political connections. 
 
Consistent with the value-destroying hypothesis, Faccio (2006) finds that firms 
experience an average CAR of –0.80% around the announcement of the appointment of 
politicians to directorship in 35 countries. Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) report similar results 
for a sample of politically-connected IPO companies in China. They show firms with political 
connections underperform those with political ties by around 18% three years post-IPO. The 
first-day stock return also reflects the negative impact of political connections.  
Mirroring the value-adding hypothesis for connected chaebol firms, the value-decreasing 
hypothesis predicts that the cost of political connections is more pronounced in large and 
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family-controlled firms. Rent seeking politicians may prefer large firms in granting favours 
since the likelihood of maximising their policy goals or private benefits is greater in these firms. 
Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2009) find that political connections prevail in a company 
with weak corporate governance. Due to their significant economic power and weak 
governance by controlling families, chaebols provide a major source for rent-seeking activities 
by politicians. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that in many capitalist economies, there is close 
relationship between political connections and corruption. According to Treisman (2000), 
corruption is defined as the misuse of public office for private gain. He also notes that the risk 
of getting caught and punished help to determine and explain the different levels of corruption 
in different countries. Wedeman (1997) argues that Korea has had widespread, high-level 
corruption since 1945. You (2005) defines corruption as the abuse of power for private gain, 
and finds the close relationship between petty corruption and high-level political corruption in 
Korea. To be more specific, founding families in chaebols increase their political influence by 
continuing to supply illegal funding to high-level politicians (Kang, 2002; Noland and Pack, 
2003). 
Chaebols’ informal political donations have been documented in Korea. Top 
businessmen’s annual contributions to former president Park (1961-1979) have reached 20 
billion won, in 1990 constant prices (Yoo, 2005). In particular, both former presidents Chun 
Doo-Whan (1980-1987) and Roh Tae-Woo (1988-1992) met frequently with heads of chaebols 
and received substantial amounts of illegal political donations. Some big corporations 
including Samsung, Hyundai, Tonga, LG, and Daewoo contributed illegally between 15 and 
22 million won in 1990 constant prices to President Chun, and about 21 to 25 million won in 
1990 constant prices were received by President Roh Tae-Woo (Kang, 2002). Kim young-Sam, 
the successor to President Roh Tae-Woo, received 60 million won (1990 constant prices) from 
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Hanbo Group, which was established by Chung Tae-Soo who was found guilty of illegal 
donations (You, 2005). Also Lee Hoi-Chang, the two-time candidate for the presidential 
elections in 1997 and 2002, illegally received a total of 44 billion won for the two elections 
from Samsung (You, 2005). More recently, President Lee Myung-bak’s (2007-2012) older 
brother, Lee Sang-deuk, a member of parliament, was found to have taken 150 million won 
from Kolon Group, where he once served as the chief executive officer (Korean Times, 2013).  
Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2009) find a negative effect of corporate donations with 
regard to future excess returns. Their study shows that every $10,000 made in donation results 
in a decrease in annual excess returns by 8.2 basis points.  
In general, conflicts of interest between controlling and minority shareholders is an 
important issue in corporate governance in Korea (Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2002). Despite their 
small stake, family owners have effective control over all member companies in the chaebol 
due to cross-shareholdings among member firms (Ferris, Kim, and Kitsabunnarart, 2003). In 
terms of major decision making, member companies rely heavily on the controlling family and 
professional management does not have much influence in this process (Shin and Park, 2001). 
While having both ownership and control rights vested in one individual reduces potential 
agency problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), there still remains a different kind of agency problem – the controlling shareholders can 
easily expropriate minority shareholders by tunnelling resources out of the firm to maximize 
their private gain (Lemmon and Lins, 2003). For example, Bae, Kang, and Kim, (2002) provide 
direct evidence of tunnelling in which the controlling shareholders of chaebols transfer 
resources from firms where they have low cash flow rights to firms where they have high cash 
flow rights through acquisitions.  
Qian, Pan, and Yeung (2011) document that political ties impact on the incentive of 
controlling shareholders in order to expropriate minority shareholders through self-dealing and 
49 
 
tunnelling, leading to lower performance of political connected firms relative to non-connected 
companies. In conjunction with chaebols’ weak governance issues, rent-seeking activities by 
controlling shareholders would be more severe in chaebol firms, leading to lower value for 
chaebol firms.  
In light of the costs of connections to chaebol firms, which are typically large and family-
owned, the value-destroying hypothesis therefore predicts the following: 
 
H4:  Chaebols firms experience, on average, a significantly more negative abnormal stock 
return than other firms (including connected non-chaebol firms and non-connected firms) 
around the establishment of political connections. 
 
4.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter develops the testable hypotheses on the value relevance of political 
connection in Korea. Two competing hypotheses are examined. The first, which is the value-
adding hypothesis, hypothesizes that political connections increase corporate value. In light of 
the power role played by chaebols in the Korean economy and politics, the value-adding 
hypothesis also hypothesizes that chaebol firms have more to gain from political connections 
than other firms. The alternative hypothesis predicts the opposite. That is, political connections 
reduce firm value, and that the decline in value of connected chaebol firms is greater than other 
firms. 
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Chapter 5 
Data and Research Method 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the data and research method. As the research focus is on chaebol 
firms that are politically connected, it is imperative to identify firms that are connected to both 
chaebol and politicians in our sample. We carefully construct a new database demonstrating 
political connections at the firm level and business group level separately for a sample of non-
financial firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange. We explain the procedures in the next 
section. Research method is provided in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 discuss the 
control variables and descriptive statistics respectively. Section 5.6 summarizes the chapter.  
 
5.2 Measuring Connections with Chaebols and Politicians 
This section explains how we identify and measure firms’ connections with chaebols and 
politicians.  
Our initial sample consists of all listed non-financial firms from 2007 to 2011 since banks 
and other financial institutions are excluded from large business groups or chaebols by the 
Korean law. Further, these financial institutions are subject to different regulations. For each 
firm, we collect financial data, daily stock returns, and index prices from the Korea Investors 
Service (KIS) database. 
Based on the definition of chaebols in Section 3.3, we track each listed firm to see if it is 
a chaebol using the KIS database. The KIS database provides all group membership 
classifications for listed companies, as defined by The Monopoly Regulation Fair Trade Act. 
We match the business group names against the list of chaebols provided by the KFTC annually. 
Following Almeida, Park, Subrahmanyam and Wolfenzon (2011), we focus only on chaebols 
owned by a natural person (i.e., founding family business groups) and exclude other business 
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groups such as government-owned business groups. We then classify the listed firms into 
chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms, and create a dummy variable that equals one if the firm 
is connected to a chaebol, and zero otherwise. The choice of the sample period is driven by the 
presidential and congressional cycles in Korea, which occur every 5 and 4 years respectively, 
beginning with the Lee Myung-Bak regime, the 17th presidency of Korea, and the 18th 
National Assembly in 2008. However, we include years prior to the Lee government in order 
to test the 2007 presidential election.   
For the purposes of this study, we categorize the politicians into four types: (i) a president; 
(ii) a minister (including the prime minister, cabinet ministers, and vice-cabinet ministers); (iii) 
a member of the parliament; and (iv) a head of a local government. We obtain politicians’ 
names and the period of their tenure from official government websites (Appendix 1, Panel A). 
We identify a total of 468 politicians: 1 president; 4 prime ministers; 48 cabinet ministers; 81 
vice-cabinet ministers; 330 parliamentarians; and 4 heads of a local government.  
To establish the presence of a link with politicians, we classify a firm as being politically 
connected if it has a controlling shareholder or top officer who: (i) is a serving politician; (ii) 
has a family member that is an immediate or in-law blood relative of a serving politician; or 
(iii) is related to a serving politician through either formal directorship held by the politician or 
friendship (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006).11 As in Faccio (2006), top 
officers are a firm’s CEO, president, vice-president, chairman, vice chairman, and secretary. 
The Code of Conduct in Korea prohibits politicians from holding directorship or 
ownership in business firms; thus cases of direct connections between politics and business are 
rare. Therefore, in addition to direct connections, we also focus on indirect political 
connections, e.g., when a firm is connected through a relative (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and 
                                                 
11 The Code of Conduct in Korea has strong restrictions on politicians from holding directorship or ownership in 
business firms; thus cases of direct connections between politics and business are rare. 
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Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006). Unlike Faccio (2006), who defines a relative as a spouse, child, 
sibling, or parent, we adopt the broader definition of KFTC.  
Firms nominated as belonging to large business groups by KFTC are governed by special 
regulations that are generally more restrictive on the operation of businesses within the group. 
Such laws include restrictions on equity holding and loan guarantee within the affiliated 
companies. KFTC also requires firms listed on KSE to report their ownership structure 
including the status of affiliated shareholders and persons with special interest, and the 
financial status of group companies. More importantly for our research, KFTC mandates the 
disclosure of the identity of the controlling shareholders, which is to be grouped into seven 
types: family owner; relatives of the family owner; affiliates; non-profit affiliates; executives; 
reacquired stocks; and others (Almeida, Park, Subrahmanyam, and Wolfenzon, 2011). 
Relatives of the family owner are further classified into four types as given Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1: Types of Relatives based on KFTC’s Classifications 
 
Based on these regulatory classifications of relatives, we classify connections through 
immediate relatives as blood relatives or in-law relatives (marital networks). A firm is said to 
be politically connected through blood relatives if any of the politician’s blood relatives are a 
controlling shareholder or top director in the firm. To identify the politician’s blood relatives, 
we use the largest searching website in Korea, Naver (http://www.naver.com), which provides 
the profile of politicians and business people including their name, age, close family members, 
directorships for business people, and positions for politicians. Since having social capital and 
networks is one of most important abilities for politicians and businesspeople (Faccio and 
Family  
Owner 
Family Owner’s Relatives 
Spouse/ 
Blood relative 
within a cousinship 
(1) 
Blood relative 
within second -
fourth cousinship 
(2) 
Blood relative 
within fifth - eighth 
cousinship 
(3) 
One's in law  
with fourth  
cousinship 
(4) 
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Parsley, 2009) in Korea, we also search the top 10 daily newspapers in Korea (Appendix 1, 
Panel B) using the politicians’ names and “in-maek” as keywords. The Korean word “in-maek” 
is often used in the media to describe politicians’ social networks. 
Table 5.1: An Example of Political Connections in the Business Groups 
The Name of Company 
(Listed on the KSE) 
The Name of 
Business Group Chaebol 
Relation 
with 
Vice- 
Minister 
Park 
Ownership 
by Park’s 
family 
Directorship 
by Park’s 
family 
Kumho Tire Co.Inc. Kumho Asiana Yes Nephew No Yes 
Asiana Airlines, Inc. Kumho Asiana Yes Brother No Yes 
Kumho Industrial Co. Ltd. Kumho Asiana Yes Brother Yes No 
Kumho Petrochemical Co.Ltd. Kumho Asiana Yes Brother Yes Yes 
Daesang Holdings Co.,Ltd. Daesang No Sister Yes Yes 
Daesang Corporation Daesang No In-law Yes Yes 
 
We collect the names of the blood relatives which we then cross-check with the 
ownership structure data from KIS. This procedure allows us to verify the top directors who 
are blood relatives of politicians as well as identifying political connections for both chaebol 
and non-chaebol firms. For example, Park Jong-gu, who is a vice-cabinet minister of Ministry 
of Education and Science Technology, is the younger brother of the chairman of Kumho Asiana 
Group, Park Sam-koo. The Park’s family owns and manages Kumho Asiana Group, which is 
the 14th largest chaebol with affiliates in various industry sectors including leisure, automotive, 
logistic, chemical, and airline fields. Park Jong-gu’s elder sister, Park Hyun-ju, is vice president 
and controlling shareholder of Daesang Holdings Corporation, one of the affiliates in a non-
chaebol business group, the Daesang Group. The Park’s blood tie results in five politically 
connected firms at the individual firm-level, and one chaebol and one non-chaebol at the 
business group-level. Details are shown in Table 5.1.  
Figure 5.2 shows the level of family members we include in our description of a martial 
networks. To illustrate, we provide the marital networks between President Lee Myung-Bak’s 
family and the Cho’s family, who owns and manages Hyosung Group and Hankook Tire Group. 
The network was established when Cho Hyun-beom, vice-president/controlling shareholder of 
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Hankook Tire Corporation, married the third daughter of President Lee, Lee Su-young. Table 
5.2 shows the ownership and directorship by Cho’s family. Cho Yang-rai, the father of Cho 
Hyun-beom, is chairman of Hankook Tire Group and his brother, Cho Seok-rae, is chairman 
of Hyosung Group. In 2008, Hyosung Group was ranked the 33rd largest business group 
(chaebol), and Hankook Tier Group was ranked 57th although it was not a chaebol. 
Figure 5.2: A Family to Family Connection 
 
 
Table 5.2: Political Connection in Hyosung Group and Hankook Tire Group 
The Name of Company 
(Listed on the KSE) 
Business 
Group Chaebol 
Relation 
with 
President 
Lee 
Ownership 
by Cho’s 
family 
Directorship 
by Cho’s 
family 
Hyosung Corporation Hyosung Yes In-law Yes Yes 
Hyosung ITX Co., Ltd. Hyosung Yes In-law Yes No 
Galaxia Communications Co., Ltd. Hyosung Yes In-law Yes No 
Chin Hung International, Inc. Hyosung Yes In-law No No 
IB Sports Inc. Hyosung Yes In-law No No 
Hankook Tire Co., Ltd. Hankook Tire No In-law Yes Yes 
Atlasbx Co., Ltd. Hankook Tire No In-law Yes No 
Celltrion Pharm Inc. 
Celltrion 
Holdings No In-law Yes No 
 
Third, we consider close relationships that consist of cases of well-known friendships 
between politicians and business people, and former directorships held by politicians during 
the Lee regime. Similar to prior studies (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Fisman, 2001; Johnson 
and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006), we rely on publicly available sources for information on close 
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relationships, which are the top 10 Korean daily newspapers and Naver (http://www.naver.com) 
in our case.  
In short, a firm is said to be politically connected if i) a family member of a 
businessperson (controlling shareholder or top director) is an immediate relative (blood relative 
or in-law relative) of an incumbent politician; ii) a businessperson is closely related to a 
prominent politician (through formal directorship held by a politician or friendship); or iii) a 
business person is an incumbent politician. 
Unlike Faccio (2006) and prior studies that define political connections only at the 
individual firm level, we consider political connections at both the firm and business group 
levels. Firm level political connection is identified by whether a firm has direct personal or 
financial ties with the politicians. If the connected firm belongs to a chaebol, none of its 
affiliates within the business group are considered to be connected unless the affiliates 
themselves have direct political ties. The firm-level definition thus assumes that the wealth 
effect of political connections does not spill over to other firms within the same business group 
as the connected firm. This spill over effect, where the benefits or costs from political 
connections are shared amongst the group members, however is considered in our definition of 
business group level connections. Specifically, as long as any firm within a chaebol is 
connected, all its affiliates in the business group are (indirectly) connected. 
Using the example in Table 5.2, we can see that the identification of firms as being 
politically linked is different, depending on whether we define connections at the individual 
firm level or business group level. Hyosung Group consists of five firms listed on the KSE but 
only three of them are directly connected through the Cho’s family who owns and/or manages 
these firms at the individual firm level. Although the other two firms are not owned and/or 
managed by the Cho’s family, we consider them to be indirectly connected at the business 
group level as they both belong to Hyosung Group.  
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Table 5.3 shows the top 30 largest business groups ranked by KFTC in 2008. Of these, 
13 are politically connected, with 12 of them identified as chaebols. Among the top five large 
business groups, three (Samsung, Hyndai Motor, and LG) are politically connected, suggesting 
the prevalence of political ties with chaebols in Korea.  
Based on our definition of corporate political connections, we identify 87 companies and 
49 business groups (with a total of 139 affiliates within these business groups) that are 
politically connected during the period 2007-2011. At the firm level, most of connections 
involve the president (25.29%), ministers (26.44%), and members of the parliaments (48.98%), 
while only two connections are through the head of a local government. For the purposes of 
this study, we categorize the politicians into four types: (i) a president; (ii) a minister (including 
the prime minister, cabinet ministers, and vice-cabinet ministers); (iii) a member of the 
parliament; and (iv) the head of a local government (2.04%), as shown in Panel A of Table 5.4. 
Sixty four connections (74%) are through elections and 23 (26%) are by appointments of 
politicians. Of the 87 connected firms in our sample, 41 firms belong to chaebols (47.13%).  
Panel B of Table 5.4 shows that most of the political connections are indirect (94.25%), 
the most common being family connections (83.91%) and close relationships (26.44%), rather 
than direct through share ownership (5.75%). In our sample, 25 of the familial connections are 
through blood relatives (28.74%) and 48 involve in-laws (55.17%). While only five chaebol 
firms are connected through close relationships with a politician (5.75%), most chaebol firms 
are connected through relatives − specifically, 18 are through blood relatives (20.69%) and 23 
(26.44%) through marital networks. Therefore, family members provide the most important 
source of connections with politicians for chaebols in Korea. Panel C of Table 5.4 indicates 
that three-quarters of the connections involve both the owner and the manager. This case is 
more pronounced in chaebol firms where four in five firms are connected in this manner.  
 
57 
 
TABLE 5.3 
Top 30 Large Business Groups Ranked by KFTC in 2008 
Rank 
Name of Business 
Group 
Political  
Connection 
Type of Connection 
Chaebol  Non-Chaebol 
Owned 
by  
founding 
family 
Owned 
by  
non-
founding 
family 
Owned  
by 
government 
1 Samsung Yes Minister through in-laws Yes     
2 
Korea Electric Power 
Corporation 
    Yes 
3 Hyundai Motor Yes 
1) President through 
former directorship; 2) MP 
through blood relatives 
Yes     
4 SK     Yes     
5 LG Yes President through in-laws Yes     
6 
Korea National 
Housing Corporation 
    Yes 
7 LOTTE Yes MP through in-laws Yes     
8 
Korea Expressway 
Corporation 
    Yes 
9 POSCO    Yes  
10 
Korea Land 
Corporation 
    Yes 
11 GS     Yes     
12 
Hyundai Heavy 
Industries 
Yes 
1) MP through direct 
ownership 2) MP through 
blood relatives 
Yes     
13 KT    Yes Yes 
14 Kumho Asiana Yes 
Minister through blood 
relative 
Yes     
15 Hanjin     Yes     
16 Hanhwa Yes 
MP through blood 
relatives 
Yes     
17 Doosan     Yes     
18 Hynix Yes 
President through 
friendship 
  Yes   
19 
Korea Railroad 
Corporation 
    Yes 
20 Korea Gas Corporation     Yes 
21 STX     Yes     
22 Shinsegae Yes Minister through In-laws Yes     
23 CJ Yes Minister through In-laws Yes     
24 LS Yes President through in-laws Yes     
25 Dongbu     Yes     
26 Daerim     Yes     
27 Hyundai Yes MP through in-laws Yes     
28 
Daewoo Shipbuilding 
& Marine Engineering 
   Yes Yes 
29 KCC Yes 
MP through blood 
relatives 
Yes     
30 GM Daewoo       Yes Yes 
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In Panel D, the distribution of politically connected business groups by types of 
politicians is similar to that at the firm-level: president (26.53%), ministers (22.45%), member 
of parliaments (48.98%), and the head of a local government (2.04%). Among 49 business 
groups with connections, there are 17 chaebols (34.69%) that are connected, suggesting that 
chaebols are less likely to be connected than non-chaebols. However, when we include the 
affiliate firms, 79 member firms within the chaebols are connected (56.83%) compared to 60 
affiliates in non-chaebols that are politically connected (43.17%). This can be explained by 
chaebols being much more diversified business conglomerates than non-chaebols (Bae, Cheon, 
and Kang, 2008). 
Based on the data we build, we create a set of dummies for political connections. In 
addition, we also construct a set of dummies for politically connected chaebols with 
interactions between dummies for political ties and a dummy for chaebols. Table 5.5 shows 
these.  
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TABLE 5.4 
Classification of Political Connections 
 
 
Panel A. Connections by Politicians with Chaebols and Non-Chaebols at Firm Level    
  
No. of 
Firms 
Connected 
(%) 
No. of 
Chaebol 
Affiliates 
Connected 
(%) 
No. of 
Non-
Chaebol 
Affiliates 
Connected 
(%) 
President 22 25.29 11 12.64 11 12.64 
Ministers 23 26.44 11 12.64 12 13.79 
Member of Parliament 40 45.98 19 21.84 21 24.14 
The Head of Local Government 2 2.3 0 0.00 2 2.30 
Total  87 100 41 47.13 46 52.87 
 
       
 
 
 
Panel B. Connections by Direct and Indirect Relation with Chaebols and Non-Chaebols at Firm Level   
  
No. of 
Firms 
Connected 
(%) 
No. of 
Chaebol 
Affiliates 
Connected 
(%) 
No. of 
Non-
Chaebol 
Affiliates 
Connected 
(%) 
Connection via Family 73 83.91 41 47.13 32 36.78 
  Of which        
     Connected via Blood Relative  25 28.74 18 20.69 7 8.05 
     Connected via In-laws 48 55.17 23 26.44 25 28.74 
Connection via Close Relation 23 26.44 5 5.75 18 20.69 
  Of which        
    Cases of  Friendship 13 14.94 0 0.00 13 14.94 
    Former Directorship 10 11.49 5 5.75 5 5.75 
Direct Relation via Ownership 5 5.75 2 2.30 3 3.45 
       
 
 
Panel C. Connections by Ownership or Directorship at Firm Level    
  
No. of 
Firms 
Connected 
(%) No. of 
Chaebol 
Affiliates 
(%) 
No. of 
Non-
Chaebol 
Affiliates 
(%) 
Connected via Owner 74 85.06 37 42.53 37 42.53 
Connected via Director 77 88.51 37 42.53 40 45.98 
Connected via Owner-Director 64 73.56 33 37.93 31 35.63 
       
60 
 
TABLE 5.4 (Continued) 
Classification of Political Connections 
       
Panel D. Connections with Politicians for Chaebols and Non-Chaebols at Business Group Level 
  
No. of 
Business 
Group 
Connected  
No. of 
Chaebol 
Connected 
No. of 
Non-
Chaebol 
Connected 
No. of 
Business 
Group 
Affiliates 
Connected 
No. of 
Chaebol 
Affiliates 
Connected 
No. of 
Non-
Chaebol 
Affiliates 
Connected 
President 13 6 7 39 28 11 
(%) 26.53 12.24 14.29 28.06 20.14 7.91 
Ministers 11 4 7 45 26 19 
(%) 22.45 8.16 14.29 32.37 18.71 13.67 
Member of Parliament 24 7 17 46 25 21 
(%) 48.98 14.29 34.69 33.09 17.99 15.11 
The Head of Local Government 1 0 1 9 0 9 
(%) 2.04 0.00 2.04 6.47 0.00 6.47 
Total  49 17 32 139 79 60 
(%) 100.00 34.69 65.31 100.00 56.83 43.17 
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TABLE 5.5 
Variables for Political Connections 
Variables  Description 
Panel A. Politically Connected Firms 
Politically Connected A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if firm is politically connected and zero otherwise. 
    
Panel B. Classification by Chaebols 
Connected Chaebol  A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically connected and zero otherwise. 
Connected Non-Chaebol  A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a non-chaebol firm is politically connected and zero otherwise. 
    
Panel C. Classification by Specific Connections 
Blood Relative A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected through blood relatives and zero otherwise. 
Marital Relation A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected through in-law relatives and zero otherwise. 
Cases of Friendship A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected through close friendship and zero otherwise. 
Former Directorship A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected through former directors and zero otherwise. 
Direct Ownership A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected through direct ownership and zero otherwise. 
    
Panel D. Classification by Types of Politicians 
President A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected with president and zero otherwise. 
Ministers A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected with ministers and zero otherwise. 
Member of Parliament A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected with member of parliament and zero otherwise. 
Head of Local Government A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected with head of local government and zero otherwise. 
    
Panel E. Classification by Owners and Directors 
Owner A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected through owners and zero otherwise. 
Director A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected through directors and zero otherwise. 
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TABLE 5.5 (Continued) 
Variables for Political Connections 
Panel F. Classification by Specific Connections with Chaebols 
Blood Relative_Chaebol A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically connected through blood relatives and zero otherwise. 
Marital Relation_Chaebol  A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically connected through in-law relatives and zero otherwise. 
Former Directorship_Chaebol A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically connected through former directors and zero otherwise. 
Direct Ownership_Chaebol A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically connected through direct ownership and zero otherwise. 
  
Panel G. Classification by Types of Politicians with Chaebols 
President_Chaebol A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically connected with president and zero otherwise. 
Ministers_Chaebol A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically connected with ministers and zero otherwise. 
Member of Parliament_Chaebol A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically connected with member of parliament and zero otherwise. 
  
Panel H. Classification by Owners and Directors with Chaebols 
Owner_Chaebol A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically connected through owners and zero otherwise. 
Director_Chaebol A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically connected through directors and zero otherwise. 
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5.3 Research Method 
Our next task is to find a setting that allows us to test whether political connectedness 
does indeed influence corporate value. If connections add (destroy) value, as hypothesized, the 
announcement of new connections should be associated with a positive (negative) abnormal 
return, which is more pronounced in chaebols firms with connections than other firms. We 
therefore examine the short-run stock performance of politically connected firms for the whole 
sample as well as subgroups of chaebols and non-chaebols in univariate and multivariate 
settings; in the latter, we control for other factors that may also affect stock performance.  
 First, we define the event dates for the establishment of political connections as the 
election (Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008; Faccio, 2006) or appointment (Faccio, 2006) 
dates of the politicians. For example, if a businessperson or her family member becomes a 
politician through an election or by appointment, we consider the date of the election or 
appointment as the date when the new connection is established. We identify the dates of the 
following five events during our sample period: the presidential election; two cases on the 
appointment of ministers; the election for members of parliaments; and the election for the 
head of a local government.12 The event day is determined by the event time so that if the 
announcement is made after trading closes, we select the next trading day as the event day.  
Table 5.6 presents our sample composition based on the event date. Panel A shows the 
five events we examine. In the case of the presidential election, we have three possible event 
dates to capture the market reaction. The first event date (President Event 1) is May 10, 2007 
when Lee Myung-bak officially declared to run for the nomination of Grand National Party 
(GNP) as its presidential candidate. Subsequent to the official declaration, from 16 May 2007 
                                                 
12 There were two appointments of ministers during our study period. The first appointment took place on 29 
February 2008 and the second on 28 September 2009. These are our second and third events. The fourth event is 
the election for members of parliament on 9 April 2008. The final event is the election for the head of 7 local 
governments on 3 June 2010.  
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to 12 December 2007, the opinion polls showed that candidate Lee led the majority vote with 
a huge margin, about 17 times more than his opponents. The poll results therefore suggest that 
the outcome of the election could easily be called in advance. The popularity of candidate Lee 
suggests that the market is likely to factor in his impending election to presidency on the day 
when he officially declared to go into election. Therefore, we focus on this first event date 
(President Event 1) to measure the market reaction to the establishment of connections with 
the president Lee.  
The second event date (President Event 2) is August 20, 2007 when candidate Lee 
defeated Park Geun-hye in GNP's primary to become the party's nominee for the 2007 
Presidential election. The third event date (President Event 3) is December 19, 2007 when 
candidate Lee won the presidential election. For robustness, we also use these two event dates 
in the event study. In sum, we construct three data sets with different event dates (President 
Event 1-3) for the establishment of connections with President Lee, as shown in Panel A of 
Table 5.6.  
Panel B of Table 5.6 shows the frequency distribution of politically connected companies 
and affiliates in business groups for each event date. In our measurement of political connection, 
we first assume that the five events are independent, as shown in Panel B. That is, for each 
event, we screen all sample firms to see if they are politically connected.  
However, in Panel C, we allow the benefits (or costs) of prior connections to “spill over” 
to subsequent events. For example, as the prime minister and members of cabinet are appointed 
by the president, they are individually and collectively accountable to the president. Therefore, 
for events 2 to 4, our sample of connected firms includes firms with an existing connection 
with the President (event 1) as well as firms that establish a new connection with the minister 
or members of the cabinet. For robustness, we recalibrate our measure of connection to reflect 
this.  
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TABLE 5.6 
Sample Composition based on the Event Date  
Panel A. Sample Composition By Three Different Event Dates for the Presidential Election 
Event Order Event 1  Event 2  Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 
Event  
Description 
Presidential  
Election 
Appointment of 
 first cabinet 
General Election 
Appointment 
of 
minister 
Local 
Election 
Event Date  
(President Event 1) 
May 16, 2007 February 29, 2008 April 9, 2008 
September 
28, 2009 
June 3, 
2010 
Event Date  
(President Event 2) 
August 20, 
2007 
February 29, 2008 April 9, 2008 
September 
28, 2009 
June 3, 
2010 
Event Date  
(President Event 3) 
December 19, 
2007 
February 29, 2008 April 9, 2008 
September 
28, 2009 
June 3, 
2010 
Panel B. No. of Politically Connected Firms assuming No Spill Over in Connections 
Firm-level 22 23 40 2 2 
Business Group-Level 40 43 46 2 9 
Panel C of No. of Politically Connected Firms assuming Spill Over in Connections 
Firm-Level 22 40 75 2 2 
Business Group-Level 40   76  114 2 9 
 
Following prior studies on the value of political connections (Faccio 2006; Faccio and 
Parsley, 2009), we employ the standard event study methodology to calculate abnormal returns 
(Brown and Warner, 1985). When event dates or the test period of the sample are clustered in 
the same calendar time period, calendar time clustering of events may induce cross-sectional 
dependencies (Brown and Warner, 1980). Calendar time clustering thus causes the 
independence assumption for the abnormal returns in the cross-section to be incorrect (Collins 
and Dent, 1984, Bernard, 1987). Brown and Warner (1985) suggest that cross correlations from 
event time clustering are not a problem for abnormal returns on a non-cumulative basis (AR) 
as long as the sampled firms are diversified. However, the power of these tests decreases 
substantially with cumulated returns, suggesting that cross correlation problems may be 
aggravated in the CAR framework with clustered event time. Brown and Warner (1985) in 
their simulation analysis find that the methods that adjusts for market movements are superior 
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in the case of clustering than nonmarket-adjusted methods. Therefore, following Faccio (2006) 
and Faccio and Parsley (2009), we employ the market adjusted-return in our tests.  
For daily stock returns, we use continuous compounding by taking the natural logarithm 
of the closing price 𝑃𝑖𝑡 of security i and trading day t: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ln⁡(
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
).                                                        (1) 
We calculate daily excess returns: 
                                                    𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡,                                                   (2) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the firm i’s daily stock return on day t, and 𝑅𝑚𝑡  is the return on day t for a 
benchmark index. As the Korea Stock Exchange consists of the Korea Composite Stock Price 
Index (KOSPI) and the Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ),13 we 
match firm i’s stock return with the index of the exchange that the firm is listed on. We create 
a dummy that equals one if company is listed on the KOSPI and zero for firms listed on the 
KOSDAQ to control for index-specific effects in our regressions. We then calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) across time: 
                                                   𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 ⁡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
.                                     (3) 
We compute the CAR for an event window (-10, +10) to estimate the market’s valuation 
of the political connection, where time 0 is the event date. We then calculate the mean 
cumulative abnormal returns across firms for each event.  
Since the price limit has been set at 15% for all stocks on the Korean exchange from 
April 5, 1995, Bae and Cha (1997) and Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) suggest that a longer 
window length allows time for price adjustment to corporate announcements in Korea. Faccio 
and Parsley (2009) show that the sudden death of politicians results in a statistically and 
economically significant drop in the price of connected companies using the (-1, +10) window, 
                                                 
13 KOSDAQ was introduced in order to support small and growing IT venture firms to access the local capital 
markets easily with more eased listing requirements in 1996. 
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also supporting the idea that the market takes time to reflect the full value of political ties. 
Faccio and Parsley (2009) explain this phenomenon from a study by Loughran and Schultz 
(2005) that thin trading in small stocks partly leads to this effect.  
As our sample consists of listed firms, including small and large firms, and are affected 
by the price limit rule and the small stock effect, we use a longer window length for computing 
the CAR. Since using a pre-event window helps to incorporate the effect of possible leakages 
of the announcement (Bae, Cheon, and Kang, 2008), we therefore select the (-10, +10) window 
in our main tests. For robustness, we also conduct tests based on various window lengths of (-
1, +1), (-2, +2), and (-5, +5). 
We test the null hypothesis of whether the mean cumulative abnormal return for 
connected firms is equal to zero. Brown and Warner (1985) show that the parametric t-test is 
well specified under the null hypothesis of no abnormal price performance. We use the 
following cross-sectional t-test: 
𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 =
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2)
?̂?𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
.                                                (4)  
The variance estimator for this statistic is based on the cross-section of abnormal returns: 
?̂?2𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2) =
1
𝑁(𝑁−𝑑)
∑ [𝑁𝑖=1 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) − 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2)]
2.             (5) 
Non-normality is a potential problem for studies using daily data since it is generally 
recognized that abnormal returns are generally not normally distributed (Brown and Warner, 
1985; Berry, Gallinger and Henderson, 1990). This violation is typically associated with fat 
tails, but could also be attributed to other non-normal characteristics such as skewness (Brown 
and Warner, 1985).   
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TABLE 5.7 
Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for Normality of Average CAR (-10, +10) 
   
Panel A. Connections at Firm Level  
 
Observation Pr(Skewness)  Pr(Kurtosis) 
Joint Test 
  
adj 
chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
Politically Connected 87 0.7718 0.0761 3.34 0.1886 
 of which       
     Chaebol connected 41 0.1846 0.4148   2.59 0.2738 
     Non-Chaebol connected 46 0.2975 0.0334 5.40   0.0674 
      
Panel B. Connections at Business Group Level  
 
Observation Pr(Skewness)  Pr(Kurtosis) 
Joint Test 
  
adj 
chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
Politically Connected 139 0.0852     0.0103 8.54 0.0140 
 of which       
     Chaebol connected 79 0.0011 0.0160 13.29 0.0013 
     Non-Chaebol connected 60 0.9271 0.0054 7.01 0.0301 
 
To address these concerns, we conduct the skewness-kurtosis (Jarque-Bera) test for the 
mean CAR (-10, +10) to see whether our sample violates the normality of distribution 
assumption. The results are reported in Table 5.7. Overall, the mean cumulative abnormal 
returns are not normally distributed and the distribution has fat tails, a low peak, and is skewed 
to the right. These results indicate that the stated significance levels may not be taken literally 
due to the non-normality problem. To address this concern, Corrado (1989) suggests a non-
parametric test for event studies in the face of distributional problems. Therefore, we also report 
the median cumulative abnormal returns and significance levels using the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test in the univariate tests.  
To understand better the cross-sectional variation in the abnormal returns from political 
connections, we estimate the following multiple regression model: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) + 𝛽2(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑙) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀  (6) 
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where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CARs) for various window 
lengths: (1-, +1), (-2, +2), (-5, +5), and (-10, +10). 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 is a set of dummy variables 
that take a value of one if a firm or a business group is politically connected and zero otherwise. 
⁡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑙 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm belongs to a chaebol and 
zero otherwise. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 is a set of control variables that may affect firm performance, and 
they are firm size, book-to-market ratio, and leverage. 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠  is a set of dummy 
variables that control for the fixed effects of each industry based on Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) of KSE, event time periods, and the location of the stock 
exchange.14  𝜀  is the error term. We estimate the regression model separately for political 
connections measured at the individual firm level and the business group level.  
In the base regression, we estimate our model for the five events as pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for clustering at the 
firm level. We use the bootstrapping approach since non-normality and the small sample 
problem may result in statistical misspecification. As in Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), we 
compute the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics to address the cross-correlation and 
skewness biases. To bootstrap the distribution, we resample the observations 1,000 times. 
Pooling has the benefit of increasing the sample size and thus results in a more precise 
estimation and test statistics with more power. However, it introduces serial correlation 
between observations within the different event time periods, thus violating one of the 
assumptions for OLS. The OLS coefficient estimate is consistent and unbiased. However, the 
variance-covariance matrix is biased and inconsistent and may cause the standard errors to be 
incorrect (Petersen, 2009). To address this concern, our bootstrapped samples are drawn in the 
unit of clusters at firm-level (Petersen, 2009). 
                                                 
14  GICS classifies 8 different industries: Health Care, Industrials, Material, Energy, Utilities, Consumer 
Discretionary, Information Technology, and Consumer Staples. Each event time dummy is the difference in the 
conditional expected value of the dependent variable between the base period (event period 1) and the other event 
periods (2–5). 
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Although we use market-adjusted returns to address the cross-sectional dependencies due 
to event time clustering, Collins and Dent (1984) propose a generalized least squares (GLS) 
method to estimate the mean effect of abnormal performance when there exists potential cross-
sectional dependencies in returns due to clustered event time. The GLS approach incorporates 
estimates of the contemporaneous covariance in the estimation of the regression coefficients. 
Bernard (1987) also shows that the bias due to cross sectional dependencies can be a serious 
matter regardless of how well diversified the sample is, and concludes that the GLS approach 
might be useful. While prior studies suggest a variety of statistical methods, it is clear that there 
is no consensus agreement regarding the single best solution to address cross-sectional 
dependencies in event studies. For robustness, we estimate our test by the GLS method. 
  
5.4 Control Variables 
 
For control variables, we use firm-level characteristics that may affect the firm’s stock 
performance apart from the event of interest, i.e., the establishment of political connections. 
The most common firm characteristics that are controlled for are firm size and book-to-market 
ratio. Banz (1981) investigate the relationship between the total market value of NYSE firms 
and its return over the period 1936-1975, finding the common stock of small companies has, 
on average, a higher risk-adjusted return than large firms. Fama and French (1992) provide 
evidence that the cross-sectional variation in expected returns is associated with the small firm 
effect. Consistent with the small firm size effect, Pontiff and Schall (1998) find small firms 
earn excess returns during the period 1926 to 1994. 
In terms of the book-to-market ratio, Fama and French (1992) find a strong positive book-
to-market ratio effect, indicating that companies with higher book-to-market ratios have on 
average a higher expected return. In contrast, Kothari and Shanken (1997) use a Bayesian 
framework and find the book-to-market ratio of the Dow Jones Industrial Index (DJIA) 
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sometimes predicts negative expected returns over the period 1926 to 1991. Pontiff and Schall 
(1998) also examine the book-to-market ratio effect of DJIA. They argue that the book-to-
market ratio has predictive power because it contains information about future returns that is 
not captured by other variables including dividend yields and interest yield spreads. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggest that higher leverage raises the risk of a stock. As a 
result, they expect returns to increase with leverage. Later studies, however, show inconclusive 
results. Bhandari (1988) and Dhaliwal, Heizman and Zhen (2006) find a positive association 
between equity and leverage. In contrast, Arditti (1967) and George and Hwang (2009) find 
that stock returns and leverage are negatively related. On the other hand, Fama and French 
(1992) and Chen and Zhang (1998) argue that firm size and book-to-market ratio capture the 
informational content of leverage, absorbing the influence of leverage on stock returns.  
Based on the discussion above, we therefore include these three firm characteristics as 
control variables. We include the logarithm of the market value of equity as a proxy for Firm 
Size. Book-to-Market is the ratio of book value of equity divided by the market value. Leverage 
is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. All control variables are measured at the end of 
fiscal year that comes immediately before the political event. 
 
5.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.8 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample firms. The initial sample 
consists of all non-financial firms listed on the KSE during the following five events that mark 
the establishment of political connections in Korea from 2007 to 2011: the presidential election; 
two cases on the appointment of ministers; the election for members of parliaments; and the 
election for the head of a local government. The initial sample comprises 6,096 observations 
for these five events. The sample is divided into three groups based on whether the firms are 
(1) politically connected; (2) affiliated with a chaebol; and (3) politically connected and 
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affiliated with a chaebol. In groups (1) and (3), we provide the summary statistics for 
connections at the individual firm level and business group level separately.  
Panel A of Table 5.8 shows the descriptive data for connected and non-connected firms 
when political connection is measured at the individual firm level. There are significant 
differences in firm size and leverage but not in book-to-market ratio between connected and 
non-connected firms. On average, connected firms are significantly larger and more highly 
levered, consistent with prior studies (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Facco, 2010). Faccio (2010) 
explains that either firms with these characteristics are more likely to have political connections 
or that political ties result in these firms having such characteristics. Our finding supports 
Faccio’s first explanation as the firm characteristics we report are measured before the 
establishment of political connections. 
Panel B of Table 5.8 shows the same for connections measured at the business group 
level. Extending the definition of connections to all member firms within the same business 
group echoes the above finding that politically connected firms (business groups) are larger 
and have higher leverage than non-connected firms. However, the average book-to-market ratio 
for connected firms (0.914) is significantly lower than that of non-connected firms (1.513). 
This result is consistent with Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2009) who report that firms that 
make greater political donation have a lower book-to-market ratio.  
Panel C of Table 5.8 presents the summary statistics for chaebol and non-chaebol firms. 
Interestingly, as with connected firms, chaebol firms also have larger size and leverage. 
Consistent with prior studies (Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2002; Ferris, Kim, and Kitsabunnarart, 
2003; Baek, Kang and Park; 2004), chaebol firms are significantly larger than non-chaebol 
firms. Chaebol firms also appear to make greater use of financial leverage than non-chaebol 
firms, consistent with Baek, Kang and Park (2004) and Ferris, Kim, and Kitsabunnarart (2003). 
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The average leverage for chaebol firms (0.477) is significantly higher than non-chaebol firms 
(0.382).  
   Panels D and E of Table 5.8 show the profile of chaebol firms with connections and 
non-chaebol firms with connections, where connections are measured at the firm level and 
business group level respectively. Several features are noteworthy. Chaebols with connections 
have larger size compared to connected non-chaebols and non-connected chaebols at both firm 
level and business group level. However, when we define connections at the business group 
level, connected chaebols only appear to have the lower book-to-market ratio than non-
connected chaebols. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
TABLE 5.8 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table compares differences between 1) politically connected and non-connected firms and business 
groups; 2) chaebols and non-chaebols; and 3) chaebols with connections and non chaebols with connections. 
Firm Size is the logarithm of the market value of equity. Book-to-Market is the ratio of book value to market 
value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. All firm characteristics are measured 
at the end of fiscal year that comes immediately before the political event. 
 
 
Panel A. Connected Firms versus Non Connected Firms for Connections at Firm Level  
  
No.of. 
Obs. Mean Median  Std. Min Maximum 
Firm Size for connected firms  87 20.155 19.850 1.990 16.853 25.129 
Firm Size for non-connected firms   5819 18.102 17.833 1.507 12.376 25.491 
Difference  5906 2.052 2.017    
(p-value)  (0.000) (0.000)    
Book-to-Market for connected firms 87 0.930 0.723 0.649 0.135 4.498 
Book-to-Market for non-connected firms  5819 1.508 1.056 3.588 -15.258 215.456 
Difference  5906 -0.577 -0.334    
(p-value)  (0.136) (0.000)    
Leverage for connected firms  87 0.465 0.500 0.175 0.020 0.791 
Leverage for non-connected firms  5819 0.392 0.383 0.206 0.001 2.673 
Difference  5906 0.073 0.117    
(p-value)   (0.001) (0.000)       
       
Panel B. Connected Firms versus Non Connected Firms for Connections at Business Group Level  
  
No.of. 
Obs. Mean Median  Std. Min Maximum 
Firm Size for connected firms 139 19.986 19.743 1.882 16.314 25.129 
Firm Size for non-connected firms  5767 18.088 17.820 1.498 12.376 25.491 
Difference  5906 1.898 1.922    
(p-value)  (0.000) (0.000)    
Book-to-Market for connected firms 139 0.914 0.775 0.603 -0.020 4.498 
Book-to-Market for non-connected firms  5767 1.513 1.061 3.604 -15.258 215.456 
Difference  5906 -0.600 -0.286    
(p-value)  (0.051) (0.000)    
Leverage for connected firms  139 0.477 0.496 0.180 0.018 1.029 
Leverage for non-connected firms  5767 0.391 0.382 0.206 0.001 2.673 
Difference  5906 0.086 0.114    
(p-value)   (0.000) (0.000)       
       
Panel C. Chaebols versus Non-Chaebols             
  
No.of. 
Obs. Mean Median  Std. Min Maximum 
Firm Size for chaebols 664 20.376 20.470 1.793 15.199 25.491 
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TABLE 5.8 (Continued) 
 
 
Firm Size for non-chaebols 5242 17.848 17.689 1.237 12.376 24.710 
Difference  5906 2.528 2.781    
(p-value)  (0.000) (0.000)    
Book-to-Market for chaebols 664 1.240 0.842 1.774 -2.790 27.870 
Book-to-Market for non-chaebols 5242 1.532 1.083 3.728 -15.258 215.456 
Difference  5906 -0.292 -0.241    
(p-value)  (0.047) (0.000)    
Leverage for chaebols 664 0.477 0.478 0.188 0.007 1.176 
Leverage for non-chaebols 5242 0.382 0.370 0.205 0.001 2.673 
Difference  5906 0.094 0.108    
(p-value)   (0.000) (0.000)       
       
Panel D. Chaebols with Connections versus Non Chaebols with Connections at Firm Level  
  
No.of. 
Obs. Mean Median  Std. Min Maximum 
Firm Size for connected chaebols 42 21.378 21.544 1.550 18.437 25.129 
Firm Size for connected non-chaebols  45 19.040 18.750 1.673 16.853 23.541 
Difference  87 2.339 2.794    
(p-value)  (0.000) (0.000)    
Book-to-Market for connected chaebols  42 0.822 0.682 0.440 0.163 2.036 
Book-to-Market for connected non-chaebols  45 1.030 0.833 0.785 0.135 4.498 
Difference  87 -0.208 -0.150    
(p-value)  (0.139) (0.344)    
Leverage for connected chaebols  42 0.476 0.502 0.160 0.079 0.735 
Leverage for connected non-chaebols 45 0.455 0.499 0.189 0.020 0.791 
Difference  87 0.021 0.003    
(p-value)   (0.589) (0.733)       
       
Panel E. Chaebols with Connections versus Non Chaebols with Connections at Business Group Level  
  
No.of. 
Obs. Mean Median  Std. Min Maximum 
Firm Size for connected chaebols  79 20.861 20.960 1.629 17.621 25.129 
Firm Size for connected non-chaebols  60 18.847 18.558 1.558 16.314 23.541 
Difference  139 2.014 2.401    
(p-value)  (0.000) (0.000)    
Book-to-Market for connected chaebols  79 0.799 0.690 0.441 -0.020 2.036 
Book-to-Market for connected non-chaebols  60 1.063 0.844 0.741 0.195 4.498 
Difference  139 -0.264 -0.154    
(p-value)  (0.010) (0.051)    
Leverage for connected chaebols  79 0.484 0.492 0.184 0.018 1.029 
Leverage for connected non-chaebols 60 0.468 0.508 0.176 0.020 0.791 
Difference  139 0.016 -0.016    
(p-value)   (0.600) (0.837)       
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5.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlines the definition of political connections, research method, 
measurement of control variables, and descriptive statistics. A firm is said to be politically 
connected if i) a family member of a businessperson (controlling shareholder or top director) 
is an immediate relative (blood relative or in-law relative) of an incumbent politician; ii) a 
businessperson is closely related to a prominent politician either through formal directorship 
held by a politician or friendship; or iii) a business person is an incumbent politician. 
Using this definition, we identify 87 politically connected firms among all non-financial 
firms listed on the KSE during the period 2007-2011. To establish the presence of a link 
between politicians and chaebols, we divide the sample into two groups: chaebol and non-
chaebol firms. Among the 87 connected firms, 41 belong to chaebols. Using the business 
group-level definition of connections, we identify 49 business groups with a total of 139 
affiliates that are politically connected. Of the 49 connected business groups, 17 are chaebols 
with 79 member firms and the rest (32) are non-chaebols with 60 affiliates.  
We employ the standard event study to test the impact of political connections on stock 
prices. Identifying the correct event dates is crucial to event studies, and so we painstakingly 
perform this task and identify the date of the following five events that mark the establishment 
of political connections in Korea: the presidential election; two cases on the appointment of 
ministers; the election for members of parliaments; and the election for the head of a local 
government. The integration of these five events gives us 5,906 firm-event observations.  
To better understand the cross-sectional variation in the abnormal returns around the 
events, we estimate the regression for the five events using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level and 
bootstrapped adjusted t-statistics by re-sampling observation 1,000 times. Our final sample size 
consists of 5,906 observations. Consistent with past studies, we find that firms with political 
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connections and belonging to chaebols are on average larger and have higher leverage than 
other firms. 
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Chapter 6 
Empirical Results  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the empirical results on the value of the establishment of political 
connections in Korea. Capitalizing on the dominant role played by large business groups in the 
Korean economy, the analysis extends to a comparison of the wealth effects of the connections 
between chaebol and non-chaebol firms. Univariate results are first examined in Section 6.2, 
followed by multivariate results in Section 6.3. A chapter summary and conclusion are 
provided in Section 6.4. 
 
6.2 Univariate Results 
In this section, we calibrate shareholders’ wealth effects of the establishment of political 
connections by firms in Korea. We conduct the standard event study methodology to 
discriminate between the value-adding hypothesis of connections from the value-destroying 
hypothesis. Political connection is measured at the firm level in Figure 6.1, and at the business 
group level in Figure 6.2.  
Figure 6.1 plots the mean CAR for a (-10, +10) days event window around the election 
or the appointment of politicians for the following groups of firms: (i) firms with political 
connection; (ii) firms without connection; (iii) firms belonging to a chaebol; (iv) non-chaebol 
firms; (v) connected chaebol firms; and (vi) connected non-chaebol firms. The market reaction 
(CAR) is by far the strongest and most positive for the sample of chaebol firms with 
connections, supporting the value-adding hypothesis. However, the reverse (strong and 
negative stock reaction) is observed for non-chaebol firms with connections, supporting the 
value-destroying hypothesis. The mean CAR increases by almost 6% for connected chaebol 
firms but drops to approximately -4% for connected non-chaebol firms over the 21 days around 
the establishment of political connections.   
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Figure 6.1 Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the Establishment of 
Firm-Level Political Connections  
 
 
Figure 6.2 Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the Establishment of 
Business Group-Level Political Connections  
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Similar patterns are observed in Figure 6.2 when we define political connection at the 
business group level. As before, the group of chaebol firms with connections experience the 
most positive wealth effects, while non-chaebol firms with connections have the most negative 
share price reaction to the establishment of political ties. By the end of the 21-day event 
window, the mean CAR is almost 6% for connected chaebol firms but -4% for connected non-
chaebol firms. 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 report the mean and median CARs for the five political events, where 
the connection is defined at the firm and business group level respectively. For robustness, we 
report the results based on various event windows: (-1, +1), (-2, +2), (-5, +5), and (-10, +10), 
where time 0 marks the first day when a new connection with the politician is made. We report 
parametric t-statistics for the mean CAR calculated from the cross-section standard errors of 
the CARs. We also report the median CAR and significance levels using the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test.  
Table 6.1 shows that the new connections, measured at the firm level, generate an 
economically moderate increase in the price of politically connected firms, which is statistically 
significant only for the (-2, +2) window. The difference in the mean (median) CAR between 
connected and non-connected firms in the (-2, +2) window is 1.47% (1.05%) and significant at 
the 5% significance level. This result is close to the 1.43% reported by Faccio (2006) for the 
same event window (p-value=0.09) and roughly similar to the absolute value of the CAR (-
1.01%, p-value=0.01) over the (-1, +5) window for the termination of political ties in Faccio 
and Parsley (2009). Thus, there is some evidence supporting the first hypothesis that political 
connections add firm value in Korea. 
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TABLE 6.1 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the Establishment of Firm-level Political Connections 
 
    Event Windows 
 
No. of 
Obs. 
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-5, +5) (-10, +10) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Politically Connected Firms (A) 87 0.86% 0.63% 1.80%*** 0.98%** 1.05% 0.87% 1.17% 1.55% 
  (0.13) (0.24) (0.01) (0.04) (0.22) (0.25) (0.36) (0.47) 
Non-Politically Connected Firms (B) 6,012 0.27%*** -0.08% 0.33%*** -0.06% 0.70%*** 0.32%*** -0.37%** -0.99%*** 
  (0.00) (0.69) (0.00) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Differences (A –B)  0.59% 0.71% 1.47%** 1.05%** 0.34% 0.55% 1.54% 2.54% 
  (0.31) (0.25) (0.04) (0.05) (0.73) (0.50) (0.23) (0.19) 
Chaebol Firms (C) 685 0.58%*** 0.17% 0.49%** 0.10% 0.79%** 0.42%* 0.83%* 0.18% 
  (0.00) (0.20) (0.03) (0.24) (0.02) (0.09) (0.06) (0.26) 
Non-Chaebol Firms (D) 5,414 0.26%*** -0.10% 0.38%*** -0.05% 0.78%*** 0.32%*** -0.34%** -1.03%*** 
  (0.00) (0.81) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
Differences  (C-D)  0.32% 0.27% 0.11% 0.15% 0.01% 0.10% 1.18%** 1.21%*** 
  (0.14) (0.24) (0.68) (0.40) (0.97) (0.75) (0.02) (0.00) 
Politically Connected Firms if Chaebol=1 (E) 41 2.42%*** 2.31%*** 3.24%*** 1.94%*** 3.61%*** 3.49%*** 6.00%*** 5.02%*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Politically Connected Firms if Chaebol=0 (F) 46 -0.53% -1.11% -0.52% -0.31% -1.23% -1.40% -3.14%* -4.18%** 
  (0.53) (0.18) (0.60) (0.99) (0.32) (0.31) (0.08) (0.02) 
Differences  (E-B)  2.13*** 2.39%*** 2.87%*** 1.98%*** 2.83%** 3.16%*** 6.25%*** 6.00%*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Differences  (F-B)  -0.82% -1.03%* -0.89% -0.27% -2.01% -1.73% -2.89% -3.20%** 
  (0.30) (0.11) (0.88) (0.88) (0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.05) 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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In partitioning the sample, we find the establishment of political connections results in a 
statistically and economically significant increase in the price of chaebol firms. The difference 
in the mean (median) CAR between chaebol firms with connections and non-connected firms 
is 2.13% (2.31%) for the (-1, +1) window (1% significance level), and 6% (5.02%) for the (-
10, +10) window (1% significance level). This finding suggests that the market takes some 
time to reflect the full value of the political connection, consistent with the evidence in Faccio 
and Parsley (2009) for a sample of 8,191 firms from 35 countries. The observed positive market 
reaction is consistent with the value-adding hypothesis of connections. As shown earlier in the 
plots of CARs, the value of political connections is highest for connected chaebol firms, which 
have an average CAR of 2.42% for the (-1, +1) window, significantly higher than the -0.53% 
for connected non-chaebol firms. The average CAR of 3.24% for the (-2, +2) window is slightly 
less than that (4.32%, p-value=0.08) reported by Faccio (2006) for a sample of firms with new 
connections in countries with high corruption levels. . 
It is worth noting that the magnitude of the stock reaction for chaebol firms with 
connections is almost twice of that for non-chaebol firms with connections, indicating that the 
effect of political connection is more pronounced in connected chaebol firms. This supports 
our second hypothesis that politically connected chaebols experience significantly more 
positive abnormal returns than other connected firms around the establishment of political 
connections.  
Table 6.2 presents similar tests for the wealth effect of political connections at the 
business group level. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported above. Specifically, 
chaebol firms with connections have a significantly more positive average CAR than non-
connected firms for all the windows examined. Although the magnitude of the stock reaction 
for connected chaebol firms is smaller than that reported for the firm level connections, the 
results confirm the value-adding hypothesis and suggest that the effect of political
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TABLE 6.2 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the Establishment of Business Group-Level Political Connections 
    Event Windows 
  
No. of 
Obs. 
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-5, +5) (-10, +10) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Politically Connected Firms (A) 139 0.51% 0.47% 1.18%** 0.87%* 0.71% 0.09% 1.27% 0.97% 
  (0.27) (0.33) (0.04) (0.10) (0.30) (0.41) (0.20) (0.35) 
Non-Politically Connected Firms (B) 5,960 0.29%*** -0.08% 0.37%*** -0.04% 0.78%*** 0.33%*** -0.25% -0.98%*** 
  (0.00) (0.62) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) 
Differences (A-B)  0.22% 0.55% 0.81% 0.91% -0.07% -0.24% 1.51% 1.95% 
  (0.64) (0.35) (0.15) (0.12) (0.93) (0.51) (0.83) (0.11) 
Chaebol Firms (C) 685 0.58%*** 0.17% 0.49%** 0.10% 0.79%** 0.42%* 0.83%* 0.18% 
  (0.00) (0.20) (0.03) (0.24) (0.02) (0.09) (0.06) (0.26) 
Non-Chaebol Firms (D) 5,414 0.26%*** -0.10% 0.38%*** -0.05% 0.78%*** 0.32%*** -0.34%** -1.03%*** 
  (0.00) (0.81) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
Differences  (C-D)  0.32% 0.27% 0.11% 0.15% 0.01% 0.10% 1.18%** 1.21%*** 
  (0.14) (0.24) (0.68) (0.40) (0.97) (0.75) (0.02) (0.00) 
Politically Connected Firms if Chaebol=1 (E) 79 1.91%*** 1.36%*** 2.75%*** 1.73%*** 3.13%*** 2.98%*** 5.28%*** 3.55%*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Politically Connected Firms if Chaebol=0 (F) 60 -1.33%* -1.06%** -0.89% -1.54% -2.48%** -1.48%** 
-
4.02%*** 
-4.67%*** 
  (0.09) (0.03) (0.32) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Differences  (E-B)  1.62%*** 1.45%*** 2.38%*** 1.77%*** 2.35%** 2.64%*** 5.52%*** 4.52%*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Differences  (F-B)  -1.63%** -0.98%** -1.26% -1.50% -3.26%*** -1.82%*** -3.77%** -3.70%*** 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.11) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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connections extends to other member firms within a chaebol.  
The above results are based on pooled political events. Insofar as the value of political 
connections may differ across the five political events, we rerun the above tests separately for 
each of the events. Table 6.3 shows the difference in returns between the subgroups examined 
is mostly insignificant, suggesting that our results are not specific to a certain event. We also 
rerun the above tests separately for each of the industries. The results, reported in Appendix 3, 
show that the difference in returns between the subgroups is mostly insignificant, suggesting 
that our results are not specific to a certain industry. 
Overall, the univariate results show that firm membership to chaebols plays a key role in 
determining whether political connections are valuable or not. From the investors’ viewpoint, 
chaebols are more able to capitalize on the political connections so that the net benefit for 
establishing political ties is a positive one for chaebol firms. The opposite is however 
documented for non-chaebol firms, where the market views the establishment of political ties 
as wealth decreasing. These findings remain intact when connections are measured at the 
business group level, indicating that new political connections by an affiliate firm has a “spill 
over” effect on the share price of other members within the same business group. The positive 
stock reaction for all connected firms is significantly smaller than that for connected chaebol 
firms, suggesting that the cost of the connection to non-chaebol firms offsets the benefit of the 
connection to chaebol firms at the national level. 
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TABLE 6.3 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the Establishment of Firm-Level Political Connections for Each Political Event 
Event 1 refers to the presidential election. Event 2 is the appointment of first cabinet ministers. Event 3 is the general election for members of parliaments. Event 4 indicates the 
second appointment of ministers. Event 5 is the election for the head of a local government. 
  Event Windows 
 
No. of 
Obs. 
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-5, +5) (-10, +10) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Politically Connected Firms in Event 1 22 0.60% -0.45% 0.50% 0.51% 0.96% 1.97% 6.00%* 7.03%* 
  (0.63) (0.91) (0.74) (0.91) (0.63) (0.47) (0.06) (0.08) 
Non-Politically Connected Firms in Event 1 1,138 -0.09% -1.20%*** -0.31% -1.34%*** 0.15% -1.04%** 0.72%* -0.51% 
  (0.61) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.61) (0.05) (0.08) (0.87) 
Differences   0.69% 0.75% 0.81% 1.85% 0.81% 3.02% 5.28%* 7.54%* 
  (0.59) (0.49) (0.59) (0.48) (0.70) (0.34) (0.08) (0.06) 
Politically Connected Firms in Event 2 21 2.85%*** 2.32%*** 3.75%*** 1.95%*** 4.52%*** 5.07%*** 5.48%** 2.85%** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) 
Non-Politically Connected Firms in Event 2 1,131 1.85%*** 1.38%*** 2.13%*** 1.58%*** 2.23%*** 1.84%*** 3.35%*** 3.47%*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Differences   1.00% 0.93% 1.62% 0.37% 2.29% 3.23% 2.13% -0.62% 
  (0.41) (0.26) (0.26) (0.30) (0.28) (0.17) (0.45) (0.54) 
Politically Connected Firms in Event 3 40 0.25% -0.20% 1.87%* 1.85% -0.73% -1.32% -2.88% -1.80%* 
  (0.77) (0.88) (0.07) (0.14) (0.52) (0.44) (0.06) (0.10) 
Non-Politically Connected Firms in Event 3 1,117 -0.09% -0.35%* 0.50%*** 0.45%*** -0.20% -0.63%*** -1.82%*** -2.79%*** 
  (0.54) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.43) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Differences   0.34% 0.15% 1.37% 1.40% -0.54% -0.70% -1.07% 0.98% 
  (0.66) (0.71) (0.15) (0.33) (0.69) (0.65) (0.54) (0.96) 
Politically Connected Firms in Event 4 2 0.99% 0.99% 0.32% 0.32% -5.77% -5.77% -10.80% -10.80% 
  (0.69) (0.65) (0.92) (0.65) (0.40) (0.18) (0.37) (0.18) 
Non-Politically Connected Firms in Event 4 1,269 -0.41%*** -0.39%*** -0.33%* -0.01% 1.17%*** 1.29%*** -0.62%* -1.10%*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.09) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) 
Differences   1.40% 1.38% 0.65% 0.33% -6.94% -7.06% -10.18% -9.70% 
  (0.72) (0.54) (0.89) (0.88) (0.34) (0.18) (0.25) (0.16) 
Politically Connected Firms in Event 5 2 -5.05%* -5.05% -4.34% -4.34% 7.92% 7.92% -3.92% -3.92% 
  (0.06) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.31) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) 
Non-Politically Connected Firms in Event 5 1,357 0.26%** -0.06% 0.02% -0.85%*** 0.52%** -0.03% -2.34%*** -2.45%*** 
  (0.05) (0.65) (0.91) (0.00) (0.04) (0.72) (0.00) (0.00) 
Differences   -5.32% -5.00%** -4.35% -3.49% 7.41% 7.95% -1.58% -1.46% 
  (0.13) (0.04) (0.34) (0.12) (0.26) (0.12) (0.84) (0.76) 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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6.3 Multivariate Results 
To better understand the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns from political 
connections, we present the estimates from multivariate regressions. We report coefficient 
estimates from OLS regressions of stock returns on dummy variables for political connections 
(Politically Connected); whether the firm belongs to a large business group (Chaebol); control 
variables (Firm Size, Book-to-Market, and Leverage); and fixed effects for Industry, Event 
Time, and Exchange. For the political connection variable, we also create dummies to denote 
Connected Chaebol and Connected Non-Chaebol firms. The dependent variable is the CAR 
over the (-10, +10) window in regressions (1)-(8). For robustness, results for CARs over three 
alternative windows (-1, +1), (-2, +2), and (-5, +5) are also reported in regressions (9)-(11) 
respectively. We report p-value in parentheses, based on clustering by company, bootstrapped 
by re-sampling observations 1,000 times, and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
Table 6.4 presents a number of OLS regressions on the wealth effect of political 
connections measured at the individual firm level. Regressions 1 to 6 differ in the date used to 
denote the establishment of connection through the presidential election. Specifically, 
regressions (1) and (2) use “President Event 1” as the event date; regressions 3 and 4 use 
“President Event 2” as the event date; and regressions 5 and 6 use “President Event 3” as the 
event date.15 Regressions 7 and 8 allow the spill over effects of connections from earlier events 
to later events, i.e., if a firm was connected through the first event, it is assumed to be also 
connected in subsequent events.  
                                                 
15 We use the date when Lee Myung-bak officially declared to run for the nomination of the presidential candidate 
of Grand National Party (GNP) (May 10, 2007) as the date of the presidential election (Presidential event 1). As 
it is not clear when the market first impounds the value of the connection, we rerun the event study using the other 
dates as described in Table 5.6 for robustness. 
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TABLE 6.4 
Regressions of CARs around the Establishment of Firm Level Political Connections 
The dependent variable is the cumulative market-adjusted returns (CAR) over the (-10, +10) window in regressions (1)-(8) and over the (-1, +1), (-2, +2), and (-5, +5) windows in regressions 
(9)-(11) respectively. Politically Connected takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected, and zero otherwise. Chaebol takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to a chaebol, and zero 
otherwise. Connected Chaebol takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to a chaebol and is also politically connected, and zero otherwise. Connected Non-Chaebol takes a value of 1 if the firm 
is non-chaebol and politically connected. Firm Size is the logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization. Book-to-Market is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. 
Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. All control variables are measured at the end of fiscal year immediately before the political event. Fixed effects consist of Industry, Event 
Time, and Exchange effects. Regressions (1) to (6) differ in the establishment date of connection through the presidential election: regressions (1) and (2) use “President Event 1”; regressions 
3 and 4 use “President Event 2”; and regressions 5 and 6 use “President Event 3”. Regressions 7 and 8 allow the spill over effects of connections from earlier events to later events. The 
remaining regressions (9-10) use alternative (shorter) event windows. The p-values are in parentheses, based on clustering by company, bootstrapped by re-sampling observations 1,000 times, 
and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.    
 
CAR (-10, +10)  
CAR  
(-1, +1) 
CAR  
(-2, +2) 
CAR  
(-5, +5) 
 
 President Event 1  President Event 2   President Event 3   
Spill Over 
Connection  
  President Event 1 
Independent Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) 
Politically Connected  0.0062   -0.0067   -0.0112   0.0058      
 (0.6241)   (0.4887)   (0.2939)   (0.5847)      
 Of which                
   Connected Chaebol   0.0498***   0.0268**   0.0137   0.0390***  0.0180** 0.0256*** 0.0336*** 
  (0.0009)   (0.0374)   (0.3663)   (0.0030)  (0.0137) (0.0086) (0.0010) 
   Connected Non-Chaebol  -0.0314*   -0.0495**   -0.0116   -0.0252*  -0.0072 0.0001 -0.0194 
  (0.0852)   (0.0451)   (0.7116)   (0.0674)  (0.3692) (0.9890) (0.1153) 
Chaebol 0.0097* 0.0064  0.0054 0.0035  0.0061 0.0050  0.0095 0.0053  0.0041 0.0029 0.0008 
 (0.0876) (0.2466)  (0.2375) (0.4550)  (0.1878) (0.2814)  (0.1081) (0.3629)  (0.1277) (0.3483) (0.8620) 
Firm Size 0.0017 0.0016  0.0028** 0.0028**  0.0035*** 0.0034***  0.0016 0.0017  -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0021** 
 (0.2107) (0.2179)  (0.0162) (0.0204)  (0.0020) (0.0051)  (0.2446) (0.2001)  (0.2845) (0.1202) (0.0374) 
Book-to-Market  0.0003 0.0003  0.0002 0.0002  0.0003 0.0003  0.0003 0.0003  0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.7451) (0.7501)  (0.8024) (0.8001)  (0.7631) (0.7566)  (0.7459) (0.7460)  (0.4680) (0.7773) (0.5276) 
Leverage  0.0045 0.0050  0.0002 0.0001  -0.0057 -0.0059  0.0045 0.0049  -0.0020 -0.0094** 0.0025 
 (0.5594) (0.5184)  (0.9779) (0.9865)  (0.3951) (0.3729)  (0.5646) (0.5219)  (0.5868) (0.0305) (0.7022) 
Intercept -0.0470* -0.0468*  -0.0601*** -0.0585**  -0.0641*** -0.0615***  -0.0463* -0.0473*  0.0143 0.0322** 0.0428** 
 (0.0659) (0.0707)  (0.0087) (0.0104)  (0.0039) (0.0080)  (0.0903) (0.0660)  (0.1914) (0.0155) (0.0237) 
Adjusted R-square 0.0276 0.0289  0.0276 0.0281  0.0345 0.0343  0.0276 0.0289  0.0232  0.0229 0.0083 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Event Time dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Exchange dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 5906 5906   5906 5906   5906 5906   5906 5906   5906 5906 5906 
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Regressions (1), (3), (5), and (7) support the univariate findings of economically 
insignificant consequences of the establishment of political connections for the average Korean 
firm. Regressions (2), (4), and (8)-(11) corroborate the univariate findings that chaebols play a 
central role in determining whether political connections are valuable or not. 
In regression (1), Politically Connected captures the average wealth impact of the 
establishment of political connections. It has a coefficient of 0.0062, which is not statistically 
significant, corroborating the univariate results. The coefficient estimate on Chaebol is positive 
and statistically significant at the 10% level (0.0097), indicating that chaebol firms, on average, 
earn a higher stock return (by nearly 1%) than non-chaebol firms. The political events that we 
examine represent a change in the Korean political landscape where the major political 
positions swing from the Liberal Party to the Conservative Party. Our finding therefore 
suggests that the market responds positively to the shift in the political landscape for chaebol 
firms. As discussed in Section 3.2, chaebols and the Conservatives have traditionally 
maintained a close relationship.  
Regression (2) shows the impact of political ties by firms’ membership to chaebols. To 
recap, Connected Chaebol and Connected Non-Chaebol respectively take a value of 1 if a 
chaebol firm and a non-chaebol firm is politically connected, and zero otherwise. Results show 
the coefficient on Connected Chaebol is 0.0498, suggesting that chaebol firms with 
connections have a stock return that is 4.98% higher than the return of other firms around the 
political events. This finding is consistent with the value-adding hypothesis and our second 
hypothesis.  
In contrast, the coefficient on Connected Non-Chaebol is -0.0314, which is significant at 
the 10%. This finding is consistent with the univariate results and supports the value-destroying 
hypothesis. That is, non-chaebol firms with connections are on average associated with a 
greater stock price decrease than other firms around the establishment of political connections.  
89 
 
One possible explanation for why the market discriminates the value of political 
connections between chaebol and non-chaebol firms lies in the shift of the Korean political 
landscape where the Conservative Party reinstated its ruling position from the Liberal Party. 
As the Conservative Party tends to implement policies that favour chaebols, connected chaebol 
firms are more likely to receive benefits under the Conservative regime than that under the 
prior Liberal government. Non-chaebol firms with political connections would barely gain 
government resource and support as most of these political benefits would be earmarked for 
the connected chaebols. Thus, from the view of investors, the marginal cost of connections 
exceeds the marginal benefits for non-chaebol firms, resulting in the negative value of 
connections for these firms.   
In regressions (3) and (4), the event date is represented by the date when candidate Lee 
defeated Park Geun-hye in the GNP’s primary to become the party’s nominee (August 20, 
2007). The date when candidate Lee won the presidential election (December 19, 2007) is the 
event date in regressions (5) and (6).  
Contrary to regression (1), the results in regressions (3) and (5) show that the coefficient 
on Politically Connected is negative and statistically insignificant. The coefficient on Chaebol 
is still positive, but not statistically significant. Regressions (4) and (6) show that the coefficient 
on Connected Chaebol and Connected Non-Chaebol are only statistically significant in 
regression (4) and the price reaction continues to decrease as time gets closer to the actual 
election date. Therefore, it appears that the stock market already incorporates information about 
candidate Lee’s potential winning even prior to the election. Of the control variables, only Firm 
Size has some some explanatory power while Book-to-Market and Leverage are not significant. 
Contrary to the small firm size effect (Banz, 1981; Fama and French, 1992; Pontiff and Schall, 
1998), large firms have, on average, higher returns than the stock of small firms around the 
political events. However, the evidence is weak.  
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In regression (7) and (8), we find that the coefficient estimates on Connected Chaebol 
and Connected Non-Chaebol are still statistically significant but the price reactions are smaller 
than in regression (1). This result suggests that the spill over effects of connections to 
subsequent events is not as strong as that when the five events for the establishment of 
connections are assumed to be independent. 
For robustness, we also report the results for event windows (-1, +1), (-2, +2), and (-5, 
+5) in regressions (9), (10), and (11) respectively. In all these regressions, the coefficient 
estimates on Connected Chaebol are statistically significant, supporting the value-adding 
hypothesis and our second hypothesis. The longer the event window, the larger the stock 
reaction for chaebol firms with connections, corroborating the univariate results. On the other 
hand, the coefficient estimates on Connected Non-Chaebol are not statistically significant when 
we use different event windows.   
Table 6.5 presents the regression results when political connection is measured at the 
business group level. Overall, the results are mostly similar to those for firm-level connections 
(Table 6.4) but statistically more stable. Regressions (1), (3), (5) and (7) of Table 6.5 support 
the univariate findings of insignificant economic consequences of the establishment of political 
connections on average. Regressions (2), (4), (6) and (8)-(11) corroborate the univariate 
findings that chaebols play a central role in determining whether political connections are 
valuable or not. Our results confirm that the establishment of political connections by an 
affiliate firm has a “spill over” effect on the share price of other members within the same 
business group. This finding is consistent with the recent study by Bae, Cheon, and Kang (2008) 
who show another example of the “spill over” effect in business groups. They find that the 
announcement of increased earnings by a chaeol firm has a positive “spill over” effect on the 
stock price of other member firms in the same group.  
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TABLE 6.5 
Regressions of CARs around the Establishment of Business Group Level Political Connections 
The dependent variable is the cumulative market-adjusted returns (CAR) over the (-10, +10) window in regressions (1)-(8) and over the (-1, +1), (-2, +2), and (-5, +5) windows in regressions 
(9)-(11) respectively. Politically Connected takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected, and zero otherwise. Chaebol takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to a chaebol, and zero 
otherwise. Connected Chaebol takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to a chaebol and is also politically connected, and zero otherwise. Connected Non-Chaebol takes a value of 1 if the firm 
is non-chaebol and politically connected. Firm Size is the logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization. Book-to-Market is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. 
Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. All control variables are measured at the end of fiscal year immediately before the political event. Fixed effects consist of Industry, Event 
Time, and Exchange effects. Regressions (1) to (6) differ in the establishment date of connection through the presidential election: regressions (1) and (2) use “President Event 1”; regressions 
3 and 4 use “President Event 2”; and regressions 5 and 6 use “President Event 3”. Regressions 7 and 8 allow the spill over effects of connections from earlier events to later events. The 
remaining regressions (9-10) use alternative (shorter) event windows. The p-values are in parentheses, based on clustering by company, bootstrapped by re-sampling observations 1,000 times, 
and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.    
 
CAR (-10, +10)  
CAR 
(-1, +1) 
CAR 
(-2, +2) 
CAR 
(-5, +5) 
 
 President Event 1  President Event 2   President Event 3   
Spill Over 
Connection  
  President Event 1 
Independent Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) 
Politically Connected  0.0048   -0.0042   -0.0039   -0.0045      
 (0.6413)   (0.5980)   (0.6362)   (0.5777)      
 Of which                
   Connected Chaebol   0.0428***   0.0236**   0.0177*   0.0158  0.0120** 0.0215*** 0.0285*** 
  (0.0005)   (0.0109)   (0.0883)   (0.1375)  (0.0370) (0.0066) (0.0021) 
   Connected Non-Chaebol  -0.0393***   -0.0365***   -0.0289**   -0.0302**  -0.0172** -0.0135 -0.0317*** 
  (0.0051)   (0.0025)   (0.0140)   (0.0112)  (0.0219) (0.1129) (0.0012) 
Chaebol 0.0094* 0.0039  0.0055 0.0015  0.0061 0.0030  0.0105* 0.0050  0.0033 0.0015 -0.0011 
 (0.0954) (0.5129)  (0.2298) (0.7535)  (0.1877) (0.5290)  (0.0.057) (0.4424)  (0.2053) (0.6581) (0.8182) 
Firm Size 0.0017 0.0017  0.0028** 0.0029**  0.0035*** 0.0035***  0.0017 0.0017  -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0020* 
 (0.2014) (0.2142)  (0.0156) (0.0169)  (0.0033) (0.0037)  (0.1887) (0.1936)  (0.3484) (0.1702) (0.0518) 
Book-to-Market  0.0003 0.0003  0.0002 0.0002  0.0003 0.0003  0.0003 0.0003  0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.7456) (0.7434)  (0.7994) (0.8045)  (0.7604) (0.7657)  (0.7349) (0.7405)  (0.4591) (0.7967) (0.5401) 
Leverage  0.0045 0.0052  0.0002 0.0007  -0.0058 -0.0054  0.0044 0.0051  -0.0017 -0.0092** 0.0028 
 (0.5584) (0.4959)  (0.9779) (0.9212)  (0.3912) (0.4577)  (0.5667) (0.5199)  (0.6206) (0.0299) (0.6508) 
Intercept -0.0472* -0.0482*  -0.0597*** -0.0604***  -0.0629*** -0.0634***  -0.0493* -0.0519**  0.0129 0.0306** 0.0413** 
 (0.0633) (0.0750)  (0.0080) (0.0096)  (0.0063) (0.0074)  (0.0574) (0.0464)  (0.2447) (0.0282) (0.0351) 
Adjusted R-square 0.0276 0.0298  0.0276 0.0290  0.0343  0.0351  0.0276 0.0286  0.0239 0.0235 0.0093 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Event Time dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Exchange Dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 5906 5906   5906 5906   5906 5906   5906 5906   5906 5906 5906 
92 
 
In comparison, we find that the effect of political connections is much more pronounced 
at the business group level than at the individual firm level. Specifically, the coefficient 
estimates on Connected Chaebol and Connected Non-Chaebol are both statistically significant 
in regression (6) and the coefficient estimates on Connected Non-Chaebol are statistically 
significant in regressions (9) and (11). We also find that the “spill over” effect of political 
connections to subsequent events does not apply to chaebols. Contrary to firm-level outcomes, 
the coefficient estimate on Connected Chaebol is not statistically significant in regression (8). 
To address the concern of calendar time clustering, as discussed in section 5.3, we re-
estimate regressions (1) and (2) in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 using a generalized least squares (GLS) 
method. The results are reported in Table 6.6. Regressions (1) and (2) show the results for 
connections measured at the individual firm level, and regressions (3) and (4) report the same 
at the business group level. Overall, the GLS results are quantitatively and statistically similar 
to those estimated by OLS, suggesting that our findings are robust to corrections for calendar 
time clustering.  
The results so far suggest that the establishment of political ties create value for chaebol 
firms but destroy value for non-chaebol firms. In Table 6.7, we extend the tests of the effect of 
the establishment of political connections by examining whether some connections are more 
valuable than others. We conduct these tests only at the firm-level since our results are not 
sensitive to how we measure the connection. To do this, we sort the sample of politically
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TABLE 6.6 
GLS Regressions of CARs around the Establishment of Political Connections   
The dependent variable is the cumulative market-adjusted returns (CAR) over the (-10, +10). Politically Connected takes 
a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected, and zero otherwise. Chaebol takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to a chaebol, 
and zero otherwise. Connected Chaebol takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to a chaebol and is also politically connected, 
and zero otherwise. Connected Non-Chaebol takes a value of 1 if the firm is non-chaebol and politically connected. Firm 
Size is the logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization. Book-to-Market is the ratio of the book value of equity to the 
market value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. All control variables are measured at the end 
of fiscal year immediately before the political event. Fixed effects consist of Industry, Event Time, and Exchange effects. 
Regressions (1) and (2) show the results for connections measured at the firm level, and regressions (3) and (4) report the 
same at the business group level. The p-values are reported in parentheses, based on hecteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The p-valuesb are based on an F-
test of model specification.  
 
CAR (-10, +10) 
 
Firm Level                                  Business Group Level 
Independent Variables 
(1)   (2)  (3)   (4) 
Politically Connected  0.0045    -0.0009   
 (0.5636)    (0.8614)   
 Of which        
   Connected Chaebol    0.0461***    0.0395*** 
   (0.0000)    (0.0000) 
   Connected Non-Chaebol    -0.0296***    -0.0389*** 
   (0.0058)    (0.0000) 
Chaebol 0.0086**  0.0048  0.0085**  0.0018 
 (0.0145)  (0.1789)  (0.0171)  (0.6321) 
Firm Size 0.0031***  0.0031***  0.0033***  0.0033*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Book-to-Market  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002 
 (0.5495)  (0.5880)  (0.5342)  (0.5684) 
Leverage  0.0068*  0.0080**  0.0076*  0.0094** 
 (0.0821)  (0.0391)  (0.0588)  (0.0147) 
Intercept -0.0748***  -0.0735***  -0.0777***  -0.0764*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Event Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Exchange dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of Obs. 5906   5906   5906   5906 
p-valuesb 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
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connected firms by: i) the nature of the connections, i.e., whether the connections are through 
Blood Relative, Marital Relation, Cases of Friendship, Former Directorship, or Direct 
Ownership; ii) the type of politicians, i.e., whether the politician is President, Minister, Member 
of Parliament, or Head of Local Government; and iii) owner or director (Owner and Director 
respectively).  
In particular, we probe further into the relationship between chaebols and politicians to 
ascertain which type of connections adds the most value to chaebol firms. Therefore, we further 
partition firms with Connected Chaebol=into i) the nature of connections, i.e., Blood 
Relative_Chaebols, Marital Relation_Chaebols, Former Directorship_Chaebols, and Direct 
Ownership_Chaebols; ii) the type of politicians, i.e., President_Chaebols, Ministers_Chaebols, 
and Member of Parliament_Chaebols; and iii) owner and director (Owner_Chaebols and 
Director_Chaebols respectively). 
Panel A of Table 6.7 shows all the coefficient estimates on the specific connections are 
insignificant, suggesting that firm abnormal returns are not specific to a certain type of 
connections for connected firms. Regression (1) in Panel B of Table 6.7 considers the 
relationship in greater depth by analysing whether the relationship is driven by certain types of 
connections for chaebol firms. The coefficient on Marital Relation_Chaebols is 0.0577, which 
is significantly significant at 1% level, indicating that the stock return to chaebol firms 
connected to politicians via marital networks is higher than the return of other firms by 5.77%. 
This result is consistent with the recent finding that marriage of a member of the controlling 
family adds values to the chaebol firm, especially when the partner is from a prominent political 
or business family (Bunkanwanicha, Fan and Wiwattanakantng, 2013).16 
                                                 
16 Using a total of 131 events of marriages during 1991-2006 in Thailand, marriages that connect family firms to 
other prominent families are associated with an 11 day (around the wedding) CAR that is 2.3% higher than 
marriages to ordinary families. Especially, political networking-creating marriages are, on average, associated 
with a 3.3% stock return premium (Bunkanwanicha, Fan and Wiwattanakantng, 2013). 
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TABLE 6.7 
Regressions of CARs around the Establishment of Firm Level Political Connections:  
Types of Connections  
The dependent variable is the cumulative market-adjusted returns (CAR) over the (-10, +10) window. Politically Connected 
takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected, and zero otherwise. Chaebol takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to a 
chaebol, and zero otherwise. Connected Chaebol takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to a chaebol and is also politically 
connected, and zero otherwise. Connected Non-Chaebol takes a value of 1 if the firm is non-chaebol and politically 
connected. Regression (1) shows the effect of political connections by the nature of connections. Blood Relative takes a 
value of 1 if a firm is politically connected through blood relatives, and zero otherwise. Marital Relation takes a value of 1 
if a firm is politically connected through in-law relatives, and zero otherwise. Cases of Friendship takes a value of 1 if a 
firm is politically connected through close friendship, and zero otherwise. Former Directorship takes a value of 1 if a firm 
is politically connected through former directors, and zero otherwise. Direct Ownership takes a value of 1 if a firm is 
politically connected through direct ownership, and zero otherwise. Blood Relative_Chaebol takes a value of 1 if a chaebol 
firm is politically connected through blood relatives, and zero otherwise. Marital Relation_Chaebol takes a value of 1 if a 
chaebol firm is politically connected through in-law relatives, and zero otherwise. Former Directorship_Chaebol takes a 
value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically connected through former directors, and zero otherwise. Direct 
Ownership_Chaebol takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically connected through direct ownership, and zero 
otherwise. Regression (2) shows the effect of political connections by the type of politicians.  President takes a value of 1 
if a firm is politically connected with president, and zero otherwise. Ministers takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically 
connected with ministers, and zero otherwise. Member of Parliament takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected 
with member of parliament, and zero otherwise. Head of Local Government takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically 
connected with head of local government, and zero otherwise. President_Chaebol takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is 
politically connected with president, and zero otherwise. Ministers_Chaebol takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically 
connected with ministers, and zero otherwise. Member of Parliament_Chaebol takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is 
politically connected with member of parliament, and zero otherwise. Regression (3) shows the effect of political 
connections by owner and director. Owner takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected through owners, and zero 
otherwise. Director takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected through directors, and zero otherwise. 
Owner_Chaebol takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically connected through owners, and zero otherwise. 
Director_Chaebol takes a value of 1 if a chaebol firm is politically connected through directors, and zero otherwise. Firm 
Size is the logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization. Book-to-Market is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market 
value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. All control variables are measured at the end of fiscal 
year immediately before the political event. Fixed effects consist of Industry, Event Time, and Exchange effects. The p-
values are reported in parentheses, based on clustering by company, bootstrapped by re-sampling observations 1,000 times, 
and hecteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A. Types of Connections 
 CAR (-10, +10) 
Independent Variables (1)   (2)   (3) 
Politically Connected       
Of which       
    Blood Relative 0.0126     
 (0.6645)     
    Marital Relation 0.0063     
 (0.6814)     
    Cases of Friendship 0.0223     
 (0.5750)     
    Former Directorship 0.0156     
 (0.7242)     
    Direct Ownership -0.0603     
 (0.4618)     
Of which       
    President   0.0459   
   (0.1466)   
    Ministers   0.0089   
   (0.6869)   
    Member of Parliament   -0.0172   
   (0.2768)   
    Head of Local Government   -0.0126   
   (0.1965)   
Of which       
    Owner     0.0169 
     (0.4215) 
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TABLE 6.7 (Continued) 
    Director     -0.0108 
     (0.6065) 
Chaebol 0.0096*  0.0096*  0.0096 
 (0.0959)  (0.0838)  (0.1016) 
Firm Size 0.0016  0.0016  0.0017 
 (0.2565)  (0.2105)  (0.2245) 
Book-to-Market  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003 
 (0.7455)  (0.7410)  (0.7500) 
Leverage  0.0045  0.0044  0.0046 
 (0.5537)  (0.5532)  (0.5551) 
Intercept -0.0459*  -0.0464*  -0.0475* 
 (0.0918)  (0.0672)  (0.0797) 
Adjusted R-square 0.0273  0.0277  0.0275 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Event Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Exchange dummy Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of Obs. 5906   5906   5906 
Panel B. Types of Connections with Chaebols 
 CAR (-10, +10) 
Independent Variables (1)   (2)   (3) 
Connected Chaebol       
   Of which       
       Blood Relative_Chaebol 0.0326     
 (0.3127)     
       Marital Relation_Chaebol  0.0577***     
 (0.0030)     
       Former Directorship_Chaebol 0.0433     
 (0.3685)     
       Direct Ownership_Chaebol -0.0450     
 (0.3259)     
   Of which       
       President_Chaebol   0.0782**   
   (0.0157)   
       Ministers_Chaebol   0.0580*   
   (0.0820)   
       Member of Parliament_Chaebol   0.0284*   
   (0.0994)   
   Of which       
       Owner_Chaebol     0.0219 
     (0.5471) 
       Director_Chaebol     0.0251 
     (0.5071) 
Connected Non-Chaebol  -0.0315*  -0.0315*  -0.0314* 
 (0.0849)  (0.0858)  (0.0800) 
Chaebol 0.0063  0.0064  0.0069 
 (0.2900)  (0.2645)  (0.2307) 
Firm Size 0.0017  0.0017  0.0017 
 (0.2181)  (0.2010)  (0.2058) 
Book-to-Market  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003 
 (0.7423)  (0.7410)  (0.7459) 
Leverage  0.0051  0.0049  0.0050 
 (0.5001)  (0.5137)  (0.5239) 
Intercept -0.0476*  -0.0474*  -0.0468* 
 (0.0699)  (0.0645)  (0.0651) 
Adjusted R-square 0.0286  0.0288  0.0285 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Event Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Exchange dummy Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of Obs. 5906   5906   5906 
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This finding also supports previous studies that family networks can be especially valuable to 
firms in developing economies where legal institutions are weak (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer, 1999; Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2003).17 
Regression (2) in Panel B of Table 6.7 shows that not all politicians are equally effective 
in generating benefits for the chaebol firm they are connected to. The coefficient estimate on 
President_Chaebols is 0.0782 (significant at the 5% level) while the coefficient estimates on 
Ministers_Chaebols and Member of Parliament_Chaebols are 0.0580 and 0.0284 respectively 
(both statistically significant at the 10% level). These results suggest that connections with 
more powerful politicians result in larger price increases (Amore and Bennedsen, 2012; Faccio, 
2006).18 
Regression (3) in Panel B of Table 6.7 shows that investors do not discriminate between 
connections through owner and director for chaebol firms. The coefficient estimates on 
Owner_Chaebols and Director_Chaebols have a similar price effect and both are statistically 
insignificant. These results are contrary to Faccio’s (2006) finding that connections with more 
vested interests in the company results in larger announcement return .19 Our results may be 
due to the fact that many chaebol firms are managed and owned by controlling family members. 
                                                 
17 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) argue that the legal protection of investors is an 
important dimension of corporate governance. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) examine 
a sample of 49 countries and find that ownership concentration in the largest public companies is negatively 
related to investor protection. This finding suggests that in countries with poor investor protections, minority 
shareholders are less likely to be important. Korean laws protect incumbent controlling shareholders by 
prohibiting both hostile and foreign M&As. In addition, anyone acquiring 25% of a firm’s shares must tender an 
offer for at least 50% of the share. This mandatory tender offer virtually prevents plurality ownership takeovers 
(Joh, 2003). Since ownership in chaebol firms is heavily concentrated, in as much as one individual has almost 
complete control over all firms within a group, the controlling owner can easily expropriate other investors in the 
firm by investing the firm’s resources to maximize her welfare given the weak legal environment in Korea (Bae, 
Cheon, and Kang, 2008).  
18 Faccio (2006) shows the market value of firms with political connections is affected by unexpected electoral 
outcomes in a broad cross-section of 35 countries. Connections through a minister result in an average value 
increase of 12.31% while connections through a member of the parliament result in a value increase of only 1.28%. 
Amore and Bennedsen (2012) find that doubling the political power (as measured by population per elected 
politician), on average, doubles the performance of politically connected firms in Denmark, suggesting that firms 
connected to stronger politicians benefits more.   
19 Connections through a larger shareholder result in a five-day CAR of 4.47%, while connections via an officer 
result in a CAR of only 1.94%.  
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In fact, four out of five of the connections involve both the owner and the manager in chaebol 
firms, as previously shown in Table 5.4. Therefore, the market does not react differently to 
connections through the owner or the director.  
 
6.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter presents the results of the value of political connections in Korea. Results 
show that on average, the establishment of political ties is only marginally positive. However, 
when we partition the sample into chaebol and non-chaebol firms, results show that firm 
membership to chaebols plays a key role in determining whether political connections are 
valuable or not. Around the establishment of political connections, chaebol firms with 
connections experience a significantly positive stock returns, consistent with the value-adding 
hypothesis. In contrast, non-chaebol firms with connections suffer a significant price drop, 
consistent with the value-destroying hypothesis. The results are robust when we define 
connections at the business group level, indicating that new political connections by an affiliate 
firm have a “spill over” effect on the share price of other members within the same business 
group. 
Additionally, we find that some types of connections create more value than others for 
chaebol firms. First, connections through marital networks between a member of the 
controlling family and a member of the politician’s family add more value to chaebol firms. 
Second, connections with more powerful politicians result in larger price increases for chaebol 
firms.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
Political connections are ubiquitous around the world, e.g., Faccio (2006) reports that 
politically connected firms exist in 35 of the 45 countries she examines. The proportion of 
connected firms is very small, less than 3% (541 companies) of her total sample (20,202 
companies). Using a measure of political connections based on hand-collected data of all non-
financial firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE), we find the same in Korea. We 
identify 87 connected firms belonging to 49 business groups with a total of 139 affiliates from 
2007 to 2011. In 2008, for instance, there were 22 firms connected with the president, 23 firms 
connected with a minister, and 40 firms connected with a member of parliament in our sample. 
In total, politically connected firms represent 7.35% of 1,157 non-financial firms listed on the 
KSE. However, connected firms are large in size, accounting for about 40% of the total market 
capitalization on the KSE, much higher than that documented globally – in Faccio (2006), 
connected firms account for only 8% of the world’s stock market capitalisation. 
One of the most distinguishable notion in this thesis is that we identify whether a firm 
belongs to a chaebol or not. Through regulatory disclosure mandated by the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission, we are able to construct a unique database to identify the family network between 
politicians and chaebols’ founding families. Of the 85 connected firms in our sample, there are 
41 chaebols firms. We also find that the huge economic size of connected firms is mostly 
derived from chaebols as they account for 35.16% of total market capitalization. Therefore, for 
a very large part of the Korean economy, political connections apparently matter a lot, 
specifically amongst connected chaebols. 
Based on our unique and new dataset, we analyse the value of these connections around 
the establishment of political ties during the Lee government, as represented by the following 
five events: (i) the presidential election; (ii) two cases on the appointment of ministers; (iii) the 
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election for members of parliaments; and (iv) the election for the head of a local government. 
Especially, we capitalize on the dominance and economic power of chaebols in our tests of the 
value impact of political connections in Korea. 
Our research shows that political connections have a discriminative impact on the value 
of public firms in Korea, which depends on the firms’ membership to chaebols. Specifically, 
there is on average a positive and significant stock price response for chaebol firms with 
connections but the reverse is found for connected non-chaebol firms. The results are robust 
when we measure connections at the business group level, suggesting that new political 
connections by an affiliate firm have a “spill over” effect on the share price of other members 
in the same business group. Our results also show that connections through marital networks 
between a member of the controlling family and a member of the politician’s family result in 
a larger price increase for chaebol firms than other forms of connections. So do connections 
with more powerful politicians. 
In conclusion, the evidence we present in this paper regarding the value of political 
connections opens up a number of interesting avenues for future research. In particular, we 
show that there is a “spill over” effect of political connections within a business group. Given 
the importance of business groups in the context of corporate political connections, more 
research is clearly needed in countries where business groups are prevalent. 
Our results also suggest an additional implication. Recent studies show that chaebols 
firms suffer a value loss relative to non-chaebol firms due to the fact that chaebol firms tend to 
pursue profit stability rather than profit maximization and over-invest in low performing 
industries (Ferris, Kim, and Kitsabunnarat, 2003). Our results only show market’s belief that 
the connected chaebols would especially gain future benefits from the connections. However, 
if it is true, politicians favour inefficient firms (chaebol firms) by allocating resources to them. 
Combined with chaebol’s inefficiency and their huge economic size, the ties between chaebols 
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and politicians are likely to bring a negative aggregate economic effect on a country’s 
investment and long-term economic growth. It is reasonably assume that connected chaebols 
firms would obtain benefits from connections in line with empirical evidence from other 
countries. Further studies should be taken whether connected chaebol firms indeed gain 
benefits such as preferential access to finance or awarding government contacts. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Data Source for the Identification of Political Connections 
Panel A. Data Source for Politicians  
President http://english.president.go.kr/main.php 
Ministers  
   of which  
       Prime Minister http://eng.pmo.go.kr/pmo_eng/main 
       Ministry of Strategy and Finance http://english.mosf.go.kr 
       Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning http://www.msip.go.kr/english 
       Ministry of Education  http://english.moe.go.kr/enMain.do 
       Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/main/index.jsp 
       Ministry of Unification  http://eng.unikorea.go.kr 
       Ministry of Justice http://www.moj.go.kr/HP/ENG/index.do 
       Ministry of National Defense  http://www.mnd.go.kr/mndEng_2009/main/index.jsp 
       Ministry of Security and Public Administration  http://www.mospa.go.kr 
       Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism  http://mcst.go.kr/english/index.jsp 
       Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs  http://english.mafra.go.kr/main.jsp 
       Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy  http://www.motie.go.kr/language/eng/index.jsp 
       Ministry of Health and Welfare  http://english.mw.go.kr/front_eng/index.jsp 
       Ministry of Environment  http://eng.me.go.kr/main.do 
       Ministry of Employment and Labor  http://www.moel.go.kr/english/main.jsp 
       Ministry of Gender Equality and Family  http://english.mogef.go.kr/index.jsp 
       Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport  http://english.molit.go.kr/intro.do 
       Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries http://www.mof.go.kr 
Member of Parliament (National Assembly) http://korea.assembly.go.kr 
Head of Local Government  
   of which  
       Seoul http://english.seoul.go.kr 
       Busan http://english.busan.go.kr 
       Daegu http://english.daegu.go.kr 
       Incheon http://english.incheon.go.kr 
       Gwangju http://eng.gjcity.net/index.jsp 
       Daejeon http://www.daejeon.go.kr/english/index.jsp 
       Ulsan http://english.ulsan.go.kr/ 
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Appendix 1 (Continued) 
Data Source for the Identification of Political Connections 
Panel B. Data Source from Top 10 Daily Newspaper in Korea 
Chosun Daily http://www.chosun.com 
Joongang Daily http://joongang.joinsmsn.com 
Donga Daily http://www.donga.com 
Seoul Daily http://www.seoul.co.kr 
Kyunghan Daily http://www.khan.co.kr 
Hani Daily http://www.hani.co.kr 
Hankook Daily http://news.hankooki.com 
Kookmin Daily http://www.kukinews.com 
Segye Daily http://www.segye.com 
Munhwa Daily http://www.munhwa.com 
    
Panel C. Data Source from Searching Sites   
Google http://www.google.com 
Naver http://www.naver.com 
Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page 
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Appendix 2 
Pair-wise Correlations Between the Dependent Variable and Independent Variables 
This table reports pair-wise correlation between dependent variable and independent variables. The dependent variable is the mean cumulative abnormal return in the event 
window (-10, +10). The independent variables include a political connections variable, a chaebol variable and the control variables for firm size, book-to-market ratio and 
leverage. Politically Connected takes a value of 1 if a firm is politically connected, and zero otherwise. Chaebol takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to a chaebol, and zero 
otherwise. Connected Chaebol takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to a chaebol and is also politically connected, and zero otherwise. Connected Non-Chaebol takes a 
value of 1 if the firm is non-chaebol and politically connected. Firm Size is the logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization. Book-to-Market is the ratio of the book value 
of equity to the market value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
Panel A. Pair-wise Correlations at Firm-Level 
Variables 
CAR 
(-10, +10) 
Politically 
Connected Chaebol 
Connected  
Chaebol 
Connected Non-
Chaebol Firm Size 
Book-to- 
Market 
Politically Connected 0.0135       
 (0.2930)       
Chaebol 0.0300* 0.1368*      
 (0.0191) (0.0000)      
Connected Chaebol 0.0414*  0.6839*   0.2313*     
 (0.0012) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
Connected Non-Chaebol -0.0206 0.7247* -0.0310 -0.0072    
 (0.1075) (0.0000) (0.0154) (0.5755)    
Firm Size 0.0259 0.1602*  0.5203*  0.1768*  0.0518*   
 (0.0465) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)   
Book-to-Market -0.0017 -0.0194 -0.0259 -0.0159 -0.0115  -0.2093*  
 (0.8952) (0.1360) (0.0468) (0.2219) (0.3748) (0.0000)  
Leverage 0.0095 0.0428* 0.1448* 0.0338*  0.0266 0.0110 -0.0620* 
  (0.4652) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0094) (0.0406) (0.3971) (0.0000) 
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Appendix 2 (Continued) 
Pair-wise Correlations Between the Dependent Variable and Independent Variables 
Panel B. Pair-wise Correlations at Business Group-Level 
Variables 
CAR 
(-10, +10) 
Politically 
Connected Chaebol 
Connected  
Chaebol 
Connected Non-
Chaebol Firm Size 
Book-to- 
Market 
Politically Connected 0.0182       
 (0.1549)       
Chaebol 0.0300*  0.2206*       
 (0.0191) (0.0000)      
Connected Chaebol 0.0507* 0.7501* 0.3221*     
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
Connected Non-Chaebol -0.0306* 0.6527* -0.0355* -0.0114    
 (0.0169) (0.0000) (0.0056) (0.3726)    
Firm Size 0.0259 0.1868* 0.5203* 0.2057* 0.0472*    
 (0.0465) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003)   
Book-to-Market -0.0017 -0.0254 -0.0259 -0.0227 -0.0124 -0.2093*  
 (0.8952) (0.0508) (0.0468) (0.0806) (0.3404) (0.0000)  
Leverage 0.0095 0.0632* 0.1448*  0.0512* 0.0368* 0.0110  -0.0620* 
  (0.4652) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0046) (0.3971) (0.0000) 
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Appendix 3 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the Establishment of Firm-Level Political Connections for Each Industry 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) classifies 8 different industries: 1) Health Care, 2) Industrials, 3) Material, 4) Energy, 5) Utilities, 6) Consumer 
Discretionary, 7) Information Technology, and 8) Consumer Staples. 
  Event Window 
 
No. of 
Obs. 
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-5, +5) (-10, +10) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 1  1 -3.51% -3.51% -8.29% -8.29% -19.32% -19.32% -16.37% -16.37% 
  - - - - - - - - 
Non-Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 1 423 0.21% -0.28% 0.08% -0.09% 0.23% -0.14% -0.40% -1.19% 
  (0.35) (0.40) (0.77) (0.58) (0.59) (0.76) (0.51) (0.16) 
Differences   -3.73% -3.24% -8.37% -8.20% -19.54% -19.18% -15.97% -15.17% 
  - (0.23) - (0.12) - (0.09) - (0.12) 
Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 2  32 -1.28%* -1.86% -0.73% -0.92% 0.03% -0.61% -2.36% -1.43% 
  (0.10) (0.14) (0.39) (0.23) (0.98) (0.81) (0.20) (0.28) 
Non-Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 2 1,260 0.18% -0.09% 0.19% -0.20% 0.43% 0.25% 0.43% -0.63% 
  (0.22) (0.99) (0.30) (0.44) (0.11) (0.62) (0.23) (0.60) 
Differences   -1.46% -1.77% -0.91% -0.71% -0.39% -0.86% -2.78% -0.80% 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.42) (0.34) (0.82) (0.79) (0.21) (0.39) 
Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 3  19 3.95%*** 3.07%** 5.05%*** 2.97%** 2.93% 2.59% 5.95%** 5.10%* 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.17) (0.16) (0.05) (0.06) 
Non-Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 3 1,120 0.17% -0.39% 0.01% -0.42% 0.76% 0.11% -0.45% -1.16%*** 
  (0.25) (0.21) (0.97) (0.13) (0.01) (0.13) (0.18) (0.01) 
Differences   3.77%*** 3.46%*** 5.04%*** 3.40%*** 2.17% 2.48% 6.40%** 6.25%** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.22) (0.02) (0.02) 
Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 4  0 - - - - - - - - 
  - - - - - - - - 
Non-Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 4 43 0.55% 0.51% 0.83% 1.23% 1.53% -0.34% -0.11% -0.17% 
  (0.47) (0.60) (0.33) (0.37) (0.29) (0.60) (0.94) (0.88) 
Differences   -0.42% -0.18% -0.79% -0.91% 29.03% 22.66% 1.65% 2.07% 
  - - - - - - - - 
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Appendix 3 (Continued) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the Establishment of Firm-Level Political Connections for Each Industry 
  Event Window 
 
No. of 
Obs. 
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-5, +5) (-10, +10) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 5  2 4.76% 4.76% 7.05% 7.05% 6.34% 6.34% 19.18% 19.18% 
  (0.37) (0.18) (0.53) (0.65) (0.48) (0.18) (0.24) (0.18) 
Non-Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 5 65 0.47% 0.24% 0.77%* 0.57% 1.11% 0.70% -0.16% 0.31% 
  (0.23) (0.60) (0.10) (0.21) (0.15) (0.22) (0.87) (0.47) 
Differences   4.29%* 4.52% 6.28%** 6.48% 5.22% 5.63% 19.34%*** 18.87%** 
  (0.06) (0.11) (0.03) (0.42) (0.24) (0.29) (0.00) (0.03) 
Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 6  18 2.09% 2.57% 3.13%* 2.26%** 1.37% 2.94% -0.06% 1.69% 
  (0.15) (0.17) (0.07) (0.03) (0.43) (0.27) (0.97) (0.95) 
Non-Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 6 1,192 0.63%*** 0.27%*** 1.12%*** 0.49%*** 1.00%*** 0.50%*** -0.02% -0.96%* 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.95) (0.07) 
Differences   1.46% 2.30% 2.01% 1.77%* 0.37% 2.44% -0.03% 2.65% 
  (0.29) (0.12) (0.23) (0.07) (0.87) (0.47) (0.99) (0.71) 
Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 7  8 -2.11% -1.82%** -1.74% -2.10% 1.62% 0.94% 5.29% -1.00% 
  (0.28) (0.04) (0.65) (0.26) (0.44) (0.48) (0.11) (0.58) 
Non-Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 7 1,535 0.19% -0.10% 0.08% -0.38%** 0.89% 0.29%** -0.85%*** -1.27%*** 
  (0.21) (0.61) (0.65) (0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) 
Differences   -2.31% -1.71% -1.83% -1.72% 0.73% 0.65% 6.13% 0.27% 
  (0.28) (0.12) (0.47) (0.32) (0.84) (0.84) (0.20) (0.49) 
Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 8 7 2.04% 1.52%* 5.10%* 2.23%** 0.48% -0.85% 0.21% -0.80% 
  (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.85) (1.00) (0.96) (1.00) 
Non-Politically Connected  Firms in Industry 8 349 0.34% 0.10% 1.11%*** 0.43%*** 1.34%*** 1.19%*** 0.32% -0.18% 
  (0.15) (0.48) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.60) (0.82) 
Differences   1.70% 1.42% 3.99%* 1.80% -0.86% -2.04% -0.10% -0.63% 
  (0.30) (0.17) (0.10) (0.04) (0.80) (0.67) (0.98) (0.83) 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
